From: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: Kernel 4.3 breaks security in systems using capabilities
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 09:25:41 -0600 (CST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1511100924280.8420@east.gentwo.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151110124043.GC3717@thunk.org>
On Tue, 10 Nov 2015, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> If you want to create a patch, my recommendation would be to do one
> that turns off ambient capabilities as a CONFIG option, and hide it
> under CONFIG_EXPERT. Or maybe adding a new securebit which disables
> ambient capabilities. Whether or not that will be acceptable
> upstream, I don't know, mainly because I think a strong case can be
That is already available and was submitted with the patch.
commit 746bf6d64275be0c65b0631d8a72b16f1454cfa1
Author: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date: Fri Sep 4 15:42:51 2015 -0700
capabilities: add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes from adding
capabilities to their ambient set.
For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
just disabling setting previously cleared bits.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-10 15:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-02 18:06 Kernel 4.3 breaks security in systems using capabilities Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-02 18:38 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-02 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-02 19:16 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-02 19:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-05 10:19 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-05 16:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-05 17:17 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-05 17:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-05 17:48 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-05 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-05 22:08 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-06 13:58 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-06 15:53 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-06 17:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-06 17:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-06 18:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-06 17:56 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-06 18:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-07 11:02 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-08 17:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-09 16:28 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-09 17:23 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-09 19:02 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-09 21:29 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-10 0:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-10 11:55 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-10 12:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-10 13:19 ` [KERNEL] [PATCH] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-10 13:35 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-10 17:58 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-10 20:39 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-10 13:41 ` Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-11 2:04 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-11 10:14 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-11 10:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-11 11:13 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-10 15:25 ` Christoph Lameter [this message]
2015-11-05 16:19 ` [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-05 17:22 ` [KERNEL] " Klaus Ethgen
2015-11-02 18:52 ` Linus Torvalds
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