From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
jmattson@google.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
mingo@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future CPUs
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 11:42:07 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1802201141160.24268@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1802201115190.24268@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2580 bytes --]
On Tue, 20 Feb 2018, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Feb 2018, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > On Tue, 2018-02-20 at 09:31 +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > > @@ -3387,13 +3387,14 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > > >
> > > > vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
> > > >
> > > > - if (!data)
> > > > + if (!data && !spectre_v2_ibrs_all())
> > > > break;
> > > >
> > > > /*
> > > > * For non-nested:
> > > > * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
> > > > - * it through.
> > > > + * it through unless we have IBRS_ALL and it should just be
> > > > + * set for ever.
> > >
> > > A non zero write is going to disable the intercept only when IBRS_ALL
> > > is on. The comment says is should be set forever, i.e. not changeable by
> > > the guest. So the condition should be:
> > >
> > > if (!data || spectre_v2_ibrs_all())
> > > break;
> > > Hmm?
> >
> > Yes, good catch. Thanks.
> >
> > However, Paolo is very insistent that taking the trap every time is
> > actually a lot *slower* than really frobbing IBRS on certain
> > microarchitectures, so my hand-waving "pfft, what did they expect?" is
> > not acceptable.
> >
> > Which I think puts us back to the "throwing the toys out of the pram"
There are no more toys in the pram. I threw them all out weeks ago ...
> > solution; demanding that Intel give us a new feature bit for "IBRS_ALL,
> > and the bit in the MSR is a no-op". Which was going to be true for
> > *most* new CPUs anyway. (Note: a blacklist for those few CPUs on which
> > it *isn't* true might also suffice instead of a new feature bit.)
> >
> > Unless someone really wants to implement the atomic MSR save and
> > restore on vmexit, and make it work with nesting, and make the whole
> > thing sufficiently simple that we don't throw our toys out of the pram
> > anyway when we see it?
>
> That whole stuff was duct taped into microcode in a rush and the result is
> that we have only the choice between fire and frying pan. Whatever we
> decide to implement is not going to be a half baken hack.
s/not// of course
>
> I fully agree that Intel needs to get their act together and implement
> IBRS_ALL sanely.
>
> The right thing to do is to allow the host to lock down the MSR once it
> enabled IBRS_ALL so that any write to it will just turn into NOOPs. That
> removes all worries about guests and in future generations of CPUs this bit
> might just be hardwired to one and the MSR just a dummy for compability
> reasons.
>
> Thanks,
>
> tglx
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-20 10:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-19 10:50 [PATCH v3 0/4] Speculation control improvements David Woodhouse
2018-02-19 10:50 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware David Woodhouse
2018-02-20 7:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 10:29 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-02-19 10:50 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future CPUs David Woodhouse
2018-02-20 8:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 8:53 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-20 10:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 10:42 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-02-20 11:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-20 11:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-26 19:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 11:26 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-19 10:50 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] Revert "x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()" David Woodhouse
2018-02-20 8:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 10:28 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-02-19 10:50 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/retpoline: Support retpoline build with Clang David Woodhouse
2018-02-20 8:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 8:45 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-20 10:29 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/retpoline: Support retpoline builds " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
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