From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v7 10/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 14:33:59 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1811211426470.1665@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b6a7deb9f976680d5d96a2c1affc032604bb1879.1542758656.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, 20 Nov 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 74bef48..48fcd46 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -406,6 +406,8 @@ static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_update_msr(unsigned long tifn)
> if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
> msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
>
> + msr |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
This is wrong. If STIBP is disabled, but the TIF flag is set to control
IBPB and this path is entered to handle a SSBD change, then this will set
STIBP as well.
> +
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
> }
>
> @@ -418,7 +420,17 @@ static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_update_msr(unsigned long tifn)
> static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
> unsigned long tifn)
> {
> - bool updmsr = false;
> + bool updmsr;
> +
> + /*
> + * Need STIBP defense against Spectre v2 attack
> + * if SMT is in use and enhanced IBRS is unsupported.
> + */
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug &&
> + !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED))
> + updmsr = !!((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH);
At the end of the series this has then two alternative patch bits and two
static keys. This can be done with a single static key which is controlled
from the bug code.
I'll send out a cleaned up version of that stuff later today.
Thanks,
tglx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-21 13:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-21 0:08 [Patch v7 00/18] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 06/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 07/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 08/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 09/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-21 13:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 10/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-21 13:33 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 11/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 12/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 13/18] x86/speculation: Enable IBPB for tasks with TIF_SPEC_BRANCH_SPECULATION Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 14/18] x86/speculation: Add 'seccomp' Spectre v2 app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-11-21 13:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 18:16 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-21 22:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-21 22:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 15/18] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 16/18] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 17/18] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:08 ` [Patch v7 18/18] x86/smt: Allow disabling of SMT when last SMT is offlined Tim Chen
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