* [PATCH v2] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
@ 2019-06-25 16:22 Dianzhang Chen
2019-06-25 16:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Dianzhang Chen @ 2019-06-25 16:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx; +Cc: mingo, bp, hpa, x86, linux-kernel, Dianzhang Chen
The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The idx can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array.
Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index a5b802a..424cff5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/regset.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
struct user_desc __user *u_info)
{
struct user_desc info;
+ int index;
if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -227,8 +229,9 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
- fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
- &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+ index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
+
+ fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
2019-06-25 16:22 [PATCH v2] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area() Dianzhang Chen
@ 2019-06-25 16:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-26 4:40 ` Dianzhang Chen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-06-25 16:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dianzhang Chen; +Cc: mingo, bp, hpa, x86, linux-kernel
On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Dianzhang Chen wrote:
> The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
> via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
> of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> The idx can be controlled from:
> ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
>
> Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array.
Just that I can't find a place which sanitizes the value....
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
and nothing which uses anything from this header file.
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/desc.h>
> @@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> struct user_desc __user *u_info)
> {
> struct user_desc info;
> + int index;
>
> if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
> return -EFAULT;
> @@ -227,8 +229,9 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
> - &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
> + index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
> +
> + fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
So this is just a cosmetic change and the compiler will create probably
exactly the same binary.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
2019-06-25 16:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-06-26 4:40 ` Dianzhang Chen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Dianzhang Chen @ 2019-06-26 4:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Gleixner; +Cc: mingo, bp, hpa, x86, LKML
On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:38 AM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 26 Jun 2019, Dianzhang Chen wrote:
>
> > The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
> > via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
> > of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> > The idx can be controlled from:
> > ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
> >
> > Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array.
>
> Just that I can't find a place which sanitizes the value....
>
> > +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> and nothing which uses anything from this header file.
>
> > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > #include <asm/desc.h>
> > @@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> > struct user_desc __user *u_info)
> > {
> > struct user_desc info;
> > + int index;
> >
> > if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
> > return -EFAULT;
> > @@ -227,8 +229,9 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
> > if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > - fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
> > - &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
> > + index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
> > +
> > + fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
>
> So this is just a cosmetic change and the compiler will create probably
> exactly the same binary.
>
> Thanks,
>
> tglx
>
sorry for being careless, my bad.
And thanks for suggestion, i'll fix that in next version.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2019-06-25 16:22 [PATCH v2] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area() Dianzhang Chen
2019-06-25 16:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-26 4:40 ` Dianzhang Chen
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