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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [patch V2 09/16] x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 18:20:14 +0100 (CET)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1911121811150.1833@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrU1i4_N8M0o=8hxxPFYisLsxpmDqM-GTsymORp9UeZYSg@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, 12 Nov 2019, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 2:35 PM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> >
> > There is no point to update the TSS bitmap for tasks which use I/O bitmaps
> > on every context switch. It's enough to update it right before exiting to
> > user space.
> +
> > +static inline void switch_to_bitmap(unsigned long tifp)
> > +{
> > +       /*
> > +        * Invalidate I/O bitmap if the previous task used it. If the next
> > +        * task has an I/O bitmap it will handle it on exit to user mode.
> > +        */
> > +       if (tifp & _TIF_IO_BITMAP)
> > +               tss_invalidate_io_bitmap(this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw));
> > +}
> 
> Shouldn't you be invalidating the io bitmap if the *next* task doesn't
> use?  Or is the rule that, when a non-io-bitmap-using task is running,
> even in kernel mode, the io bitmap is always invalid.

Well it does not make much of a difference whether we do the above or
!(tifn & _TIF_IO_BITMAP). We always end up in that code when one of the
involved tasks has TIF_IO_BITMAP set. I decided to use the sched out check
because that makes it clear that this is the end of the valid I/O
bitmap. If the next task has TIF_IO_BITMAP set as well, then it will anyway
end up in the exit to user mode update code. Clearing it here ensures that
even if the exit to user mode malfunctions the bitmap cannot be leaked.

> As it stands, you need exit_thread() to invalidate the bitmap.  I
> assume it does, but I can't easily see it in the middle of the series
> like this.

It does.
 
> IOW your code might be fine, but it could at least use some comments
> in appropriate places (exit_to_usermode_loop()?) that we guarantee
> that, if the bit is *clear*, then the TSS has the io bitmap marked
> invalid.  And add an assertion under CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY.
> 
> Also, do you need to update EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS?

No, the TIF_IO_BITMAP check is done once after the loop has run and it
would not make any sense in the loop as TIF_IO_BITMAP cannot be cleared
there and we'd loop forever. The other usermode loop flags are transient.

Thanks,

	tglx



  reply	other threads:[~2019-11-12 17:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-11 22:03 [patch V2 00/16] x86/iopl: Prevent user space from using CLI/STI with iopl(3) Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 01/16] x86/ptrace: Prevent truncation of bitmap size Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 15:34   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 02/16] x86/process: Unify copy_thread_tls() Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 03/16] x86/cpu: Unify cpu_init() Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 04/16] x86/tss: Fix and move VMX BUILD_BUG_ON() Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-12 15:37   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 05/16] x86/iopl: Cleanup include maze Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 15:37   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 06/16] x86/io: Speedup schedule out of I/O bitmap user Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 16:00   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-12 17:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 07/16] x86/ioperm: Move iobitmap data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 16:02   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-12 17:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 08/16] x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence number Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12  9:22   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-12  9:55     ` [patch V2 08/16] x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence numberc Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 16:08   ` [patch V2 08/16] x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence number Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-12 17:10     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 09/16] x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 16:16   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-12 17:20     ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2019-11-12 17:41       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-12 17:46         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-11-13  8:30           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 10/16] x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 17:43   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 11/16] x86/ioperm: Share I/O bitmap if identical Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12  7:14   ` Ingo Molnar
2019-11-12  7:17     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12  7:52       ` Ingo Molnar
2019-11-12  9:15   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-12  9:51     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-14 11:02     ` David Laight
2019-11-14 12:39       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-14 13:09       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-14 13:22         ` David Laight
2019-11-12 18:12   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 12/16] selftests/x86/ioperm: Extend testing so the shared bitmap is exercised Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 13/16] x86/iopl: Fixup misleading comment Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 18:14   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 14/16] x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scope Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 23:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12  6:32     ` Ingo Molnar
2019-11-12  8:42   ` Ingo Molnar
2019-11-12 10:07     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 18:35   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 15/16] x86/iopl: Remove legacy IOPL option Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12 18:37   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-12 19:40     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-11 22:03 ` [patch V2 16/16] selftests/x86/iopl: Extend test to cover IOPL emulation Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-12  7:40 ` [PATCH] x86/iopl: Factor out IO-bitmap related TSS fields into 'struct x86_io_bitmap' Ingo Molnar
2019-11-12  7:59   ` [PATCH] x86/iopl: Harmonize 'struct io_bitmap' and 'struct x86_io_bitmap' nomenclature Ingo Molnar
2019-11-12  8:11   ` [PATCH] x86/iopl: Clear up the role of the two bitmap copying fields Ingo Molnar
2019-11-12  8:15   ` [PATCH] x86/iopl: Rename <asm/iobitmap.h> to <asm/io_bitmap.h> Ingo Molnar

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