From: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 12:29:50 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1710201229350.11454@t440.gateway.2wire.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171019130809.2farwdz3uav6vlp3@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
> > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
> > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
> > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
> > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
> > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
> > set*id.
>
> <crickets>
>
> Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul
> has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities
> patches rather than audit?
>
Sure, I will take it.
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
> >
> > The first to eighth patches just massage the logic to make it easier to
> > understand. Some of them could be squashed together.
> >
> > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth.
> >
> > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of
> > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)"
> > to
> > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))"
> > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think
> > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand.
> >
> > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging
> > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some
> > duplication in the logic.
> >
> > Passes: (ltp 20170516)
> > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
> > ./runltp -f securebits
> > ./runltp -f cap_bounds
> > ./runltp -f filecaps
> > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs)
> >
> > Since this is mostly capabilities related rather than audit, could this go
> > through the capabilites (Serge) or security (James) trees please? Thanks!
> >
> > v5
> > rebase on linux-security/next 4.14-rc2
> > added comment block header to handle_privileged_root()
> > moved comment in handle_privileged_root()
> > moved root_privileged() check back into handle_privileged_root()
> >
> > v4
> > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes
> > minor local func renames
> >
> > v3
> > refactor into several sub-functions
> > convert most macros to inline funcs
> >
> > v2
> > use macros to clarify intent of calculations
> > fix original logic error
> > address additional audit logging conditions
> >
> > Richard Guy Briggs (10):
> > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
> > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
> > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
> > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
> > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
> > capabilities: move audit log decision to function
> > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
> > capabilities: invert logic for clarity
> > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
> > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
> >
> > security/commoncap.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
> > 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
> >
> > --
> > 1.8.3.1
> >
> > --
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
> - RGB
>
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
> Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
> IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
> Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
>
--
James Morris
<james.l.morris@oracle.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-20 1:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-12 0:57 [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-19 13:08 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-20 1:29 ` James Morris [this message]
2017-10-20 2:34 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-20 5:15 ` James Morris
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