From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "Hector Marco Gisbert" <hecmargi@upv.es>,
"Cyrill Gorcunov" <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
"Pavel Emelyanov" <xemul@parallels.com>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Anton Blanchard" <anton@samba.org>,
"Russell King - ARM Linux" <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"David Daney" <ddaney.cavm@gmail.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Arun Chandran" <achandran@mvista.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
"Ismael Ripoll" <iripoll@disca.upv.es>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Hanno Böck" <hanno@hboeck.de>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Reno Robert" <renorobert@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ASLRv3: randomize_va_space=3 preventing offset2lib attack
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 20:49:54 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1412222047090.1680@pobox.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWUXbzb_MMEugWNzuY-gebkUbzLW6Z=gmCfau7oBRUdJg@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 22 Dec 2014, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> a. With PIE executables, the offset from the executable to the
> libraries is constant. This is unfortunate when your threat model
> allows you to learn the executable base address and all your gadgets
> are in shared libraries.
When I was originally pushing PIE executable randomization, I have been
thinking about ways to solve this.
In theory, we could start playing games with load_addr in
load_elf_interp() and randomizing it completely independently from mmap()
base randomization, but the question is whether it's really worth the
hassle and binfmt_elf code complication. I am not convinced.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-12-22 19:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <5489E6D2.2060200@upv.es>
2014-12-11 20:12 ` [PATCH] ASLRv3: randomize_va_space=3 preventing offset2lib attack Hector Marco
2014-12-11 22:11 ` Kees Cook
2014-12-12 16:32 ` Hector Marco
2014-12-12 17:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-19 22:04 ` Hector Marco
2014-12-19 22:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-19 22:19 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-12-19 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-20 0:29 ` [PATCH] x86_64, vdso: Fix the vdso address randomization algorithm Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-20 17:40 ` [PATCH v2] " Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-20 21:13 ` Kees Cook
2014-12-22 17:36 ` [PATCH] ASLRv3: randomize_va_space=3 preventing offset2lib attack Hector Marco Gisbert
2014-12-22 17:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-22 19:49 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2014-12-22 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-22 20:03 ` Jiri Kosina
2014-12-22 20:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-22 23:23 ` Hector Marco Gisbert
2014-12-22 23:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CAH4rwTKeN0P84FJnocoKV4t9rc2Ox_EYc+LEibD+Y83n7C8aVA@mail.gmail.com>
2014-12-23 8:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-23 20:06 ` Hector Marco Gisbert
2014-12-23 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-07 17:26 ` Hector Marco Gisbert
2014-12-05 0:07 Hector Marco
2014-12-05 20:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-12-08 22:15 ` Hector Marco Gisbert
2014-12-05 22:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 20:09 ` Christian Borntraeger
2014-12-09 17:37 ` Kees Cook
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