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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 19:54:24 +1000 (EST)	[thread overview]
raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090507092009.GC3036@sequoia.sous-sol.org>

On Thu, 7 May 2009, Chris Wright wrote:

> * Ingo Molnar (mingo@elte.hu) wrote:

[Added LSM list to the CC; please do so whenever making changes in this 
area...]

> > They have no active connection to the core kernel 
> > ptrace_may_access() check in any case:
> 
> Not sure what you mean:
> 
> ptrace_may_access
>  __ptrace_may_access
>   security_ptrace_may_access
> 
> Looks like your patch won't compile.
> 

Below is an updated version which fixes the bug, against 
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next

Boot tested with SELinux.

commit c4c79671177dc3e8387c337f75f3c664cdf08838
Author: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Date:   Thu May 7 19:26:19 2009 +1000

    security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
    
    The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
    ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
    a retval convention.
    
    Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.
    
    [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
    
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
    Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 54ed157..0147def 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
 extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 		       int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
- * @ptrace_may_access:
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
  *	Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
  *	@child process.
  *	Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
@@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
  *	current process before allowing the current process to present itself
  *	to the @parent process for tracing.
- *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
+ *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
  *	checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
  *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 struct security_operations {
 	char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
-	int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+	int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 	int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
 	int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
 		       kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
 extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 /* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1797,10 +1797,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 					     unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index c9cf48b..284d0ac 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
+	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
 }
 
 bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 21b6cea..f218dd3 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
 
 void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 97ac1f1..e57611a 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 }
 
 /**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
  *			   another
  * @child: The process to be accessed
  * @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
  * granted, -ve if denied.
  */
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
index 40fb4f1..e8d5861 100644
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ b/security/root_plug.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
 	/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
-	.ptrace_may_access =		cap_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		cap_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		cap_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget =			cap_capget,
 	.capset =			cap_capset,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 206e538..a3e6918 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 
 /* Security operations */
 
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 39046dd..e30c4bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1854,12 +1854,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 				     unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -5310,7 +5310,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.name =				"selinux",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
 	.capset =			selinux_capset,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f557767..79949f9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
  *
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	char *sp, *tsp;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3031,7 +3031,7 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.name =				"smack",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		smack_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		smack_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget = 			cap_capget,
 	.capset = 			cap_capset,

  reply	other threads:[~2009-05-07  9:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-05-05 22:47 [PATCH 3/3] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-06  2:08 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-06  8:00 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3a] ptrace: add _ptrace_may_access() Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 20:32   ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-06 20:47     ` Christoph Hellwig
2009-05-06 21:09       ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07  8:19       ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  8:17     ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 23:53   ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-07  0:21     ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07  6:36       ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-07  8:20         ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  8:31           ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-07  8:38             ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  8:49               ` [patch] security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  9:19                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-07  9:27                   ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  8:57               ` [RFC PATCH 3/3a] ptrace: add _ptrace_may_access() Chris Wright
2009-05-07  9:04                 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  9:20                   ` Chris Wright
2009-05-07  9:54                     ` James Morris [this message]
2009-05-07 10:20                       ` your mail Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 11:37                         ` security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check James Morris
2009-05-07 14:17                           ` Ingo Molnar
2009-06-23 14:14                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-06-23 17:49                             ` Christoph Hellwig
2009-06-23 19:24                               ` [PATCH 0/1] mm_for_maps: simplify, use ptrace_may_access() Oleg Nesterov
2009-06-23 19:25                                 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2009-06-24  3:06                                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-24 14:21                                     ` James Morris
2009-06-24  9:25                                   ` Roland McGrath
2009-06-24 14:37                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-06-24  1:08                             ` security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check James Morris
2009-05-08  3:27                         ` your mail Casey Schaufler
2009-06-24 14:19                       ` security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check James Morris
2009-05-07  9:31                   ` [RFC PATCH 3/3a] ptrace: add _ptrace_may_access() Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  9:49                     ` [patch 1/2] ptrace, security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:47                       ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 19:55                       ` Andrew Morton
2009-05-11 13:39                         ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-11 18:51                           ` Andrew Morton
2009-05-15  1:10                           ` Américo Wang
2009-05-15 19:34                             ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07  9:50                     ` [patch 2/2] ptrace: turn ptrace_access_check() into a retval function Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:47                       ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-06 22:46 ` [PATCH 3/3] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach Chris Wright
2009-05-06 23:13   ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-06 23:27     ` Chris Wright
2009-05-06 23:48       ` James Morris
2009-05-07  1:17         ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-08 12:18         ` David Howells

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