From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933881Ab0KOW7h (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Nov 2010 17:59:37 -0500 Received: from tundra.namei.org ([65.99.196.166]:57805 "EHLO tundra.namei.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933655Ab0KOW7e (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Nov 2010 17:59:34 -0500 Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 09:58:37 +1100 (EST) From: James Morris To: Eric Paris cc: Eric Paris , Linus Torvalds , Joe Perches , Dan Rosenberg , LKML , Ingo Molnar , Eugene Teo , Kees Cook , Andrew Morton , LSM List Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix dmesg_restrict build failure with CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y and CONFIG_PRINTK=n In-Reply-To: <1289860987.14282.40.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: References: <1289669176.16461.12.camel@Joe-Laptop> <1289677904.16461.82.camel@Joe-Laptop> <1289860987.14282.40.camel@localhost.localdomain> User-Agent: Alpine 2.00 (LRH 1167 2008-08-23) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 15 Nov 2010, Eric Paris wrote: > Not sure how that's possible. I mean, I guess it's possible if the > fabled LSM reimplements the cap call, but I'm not sure how you can > remove a restrictive only security check without 'weakening' the system > in some way. If generic security logic is mixed into a capability call, then not implementing the cap call also loses the generic security logic. e.g. dmesg_restrict should always be verified, regardless of whether cap_security() is called or not. If cap_syslog() should always be called, then it should not be possible not not call it :-) - James -- James Morris