From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 20:32:02 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1705302025110.31018@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1496003387-3184-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Mon, 29 May 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Igor proposed a sealable memory allocator, and the LSM hooks
> ("struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads" and
> "struct security_hook_list ...[]") will benefit from that allocator via
> protection using set_memory_ro()/set_memory_rw(), and that allocator
> will remove CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS config option. Thus, we will
> likely be moving to that direction.
>
> This means that these structures will be allocated at run time using
> that allocator, and therefore the address of these structures will be
> determined at run time rather than compile time.
>
> But currently, LSM_HOOK_INIT() macro depends on the address of
> security_hook_heads being known at compile time. If we use an enum
> so that LSM_HOOK_INIT() macro does not need to know absolute address of
> security_hook_heads, it will help us to use that allocator for LSM hooks.
>
This seems like pointless churn in security-critical code in anticipation
of features which are still in development and may not be adopted.
Is there a compelling reason to merge this now? (And I don't mean worrying
about non-existent compliers).
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-30 10:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-27 11:17 [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 0:38 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 17:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:22 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 14:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 15:25 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 23:06 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:04 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 14:43 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:14 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 9:44 ` José Bollo
2017-05-28 20:29 ` [PATCH v2] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 21:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-29 17:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:32 ` James Morris [this message]
2017-05-31 20:49 ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 22:56 ` James Morris
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