From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751904AbdH1Djm (ORCPT ); Sun, 27 Aug 2017 23:39:42 -0400 Received: from namei.org ([65.99.196.166]:54223 "EHLO namei.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751726AbdH1Djk (ORCPT ); Sun, 27 Aug 2017 23:39:40 -0400 Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 13:38:26 +1000 (AEST) From: James Morris To: =?ISO-8859-15?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Matthew Garrett , Michael Kerrisk , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Tejun Heo , Thomas Graf , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing In-Reply-To: <20170821000933.13024-1-mic@digikod.net> Message-ID: References: <20170821000933.13024-1-mic@digikod.net> User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (LRH 67 2015-01-07) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; BOUNDARY="1665246916-700125660-1503891508=:8842" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. --1665246916-700125660-1503891508=:8842 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT On Mon, 21 Aug 2017, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > ## Why a new LSM? Are SELinux, AppArmor, Smack and Tomoyo not good enough? > > The current access control LSMs are fine for their purpose which is to give the > *root* the ability to enforce a security policy for the *system*. What is > missing is a way to enforce a security policy for any application by its > developer and *unprivileged user* as seccomp can do for raw syscall filtering. > You could mention here that the first case is Mandatory Access Control, in general terms. -- James Morris --1665246916-700125660-1503891508=:8842--