From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDFCAC10F00 for ; Sat, 9 Mar 2019 04:45:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9770620866 for ; Sat, 9 Mar 2019 04:45:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726711AbfCIEpm (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Mar 2019 23:45:42 -0500 Received: from namei.org ([65.99.196.166]:56226 "EHLO namei.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726352AbfCIEpl (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Mar 2019 23:45:41 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by namei.org (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id x294jaje024550; Sat, 9 Mar 2019 04:45:36 GMT Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2019 15:45:36 +1100 (AEDT) From: James Morris To: Matthew Garrett cc: LSM List , Linux Kernel Mailing List , David Howells Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down In-Reply-To: Message-ID: References: <20190306235913.6631-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> <20190306235913.6631-4-matthewgarrett@google.com> User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (LRH 202 2017-01-01) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Post: On Fri, 8 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 3:00 PM James Morris wrote: > > > > On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > > > From: David Howells > > > > > > If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid > > > signatures that we can verify. > > > > Perhaps note that this won't cover the case where folk are using DM-Verity > > with a signed root hash for verifying kernel modules. > > Mm. I can't see a terribly good way of doing this generically - > loadpin gives no indication to the module loading code that it comes > from a trusted source. Would making the lockdown/module signature > enforcement a separate config option be reasonable? I was just suggest documenting this. -- James Morris