From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V37 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 08:43:05 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1908090842390.14740@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJuu6gFQUQQOVj2MwL5+dx+XsBKY=Uq58r7F8Lr2C0Gi_TA@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 8 Aug 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 8, 2019 at 3:01 AM Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> wrote:
> > If you're confident that a hard dependency is not the right approach,
> > then perhaps we could add a comment in the Kconfig (You could take a
> > look at the comment under MODULE_SIG_ALL in init/Kconfig for an
> > example)? If someone is configuring the kernel on their own then it'd
> > be nice to let them know, otherwise having a lockdown kernel without
> > module signatures would defeat the purpose of lockdown no? :-)
>
> James, what would your preference be here? Jessica is right that not
> having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG enabled means lockdown probably doesn't work
> as expected, but tying it to the lockdown LSM seems inappropriate when
> another LSM could be providing lockdown policy and run into the same
> issue. Should this just be mentioned in the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG Kconfig
> help?
I agree and yes mention it in the help. A respin of just this patch is
fine.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-08 22:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-31 22:15 [PATCH V37 00/29] security: Add support for locking down the kernel Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-01 14:21 ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-01 20:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 10:01 ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-08 18:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 22:43 ` James Morris [this message]
2019-08-09 20:59 ` [PATCH V39] " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:15 ` [PATCH V37 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-08-01 16:19 ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-01 20:44 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <CGME20190813061053eucas1p1b6945259d9663b743e7cb32521d041e7@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2019-08-13 6:10 ` Marek Szyprowski
[not found] ` <CGME20190813072111eucas1p2b87f3f8d16c22a0a3d024bc5ebcc8bcc@eucas1p2.samsung.com>
2019-08-13 7:21 ` Marek Szyprowski
[not found] ` <CGME20190814061246eucas1p128cae99a14f27bc79fa2aa72084a0413@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2019-08-14 6:12 ` [PATCH] tracefs: Fix NULL pointer dereference when no lockdown is used Marek Szyprowski
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 22:16 ` [PATCH V37 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
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