Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add asymmetric cipher interface

[Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>]

On Thu, 9 Jun 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:

> Am Mittwoch, 8. Juni 2016, 12:14:49 schrieb Mat Martineau:
>
> Hi Mat,
>
>> On Wed, 8 Jun 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>> Am Dienstag, 7. Juni 2016, 17:28:07 schrieb Mat Martineau:
>>>
>>> Hi Mat,
>>>
>>>>> +	used = ctx->used;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +	/* convert iovecs of output buffers into scatterlists */
>>>>> +	while (iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
>>>>> +		/* make one iovec available as scatterlist */
>>>>> +		err = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl[cnt], &msg->msg_iter,
>>>>> +				     iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter));
>>>>> +		if (err < 0)
>>>>> +			goto unlock;
>>>>> +		usedpages += err;
>>>>> +		/* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */
>>>>> +		if (cnt)
>>>>> +			af_alg_link_sg(&ctx->rsgl[cnt - 1], &ctx->rsgl[cnt]);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +		iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
>>>>> +		cnt++;
>>>>> +	}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +	/* ensure output buffer is sufficiently large */
>>>>> +	if (usedpages < akcipher_calcsize(ctx)) {
>>>>> +		err = -EMSGSIZE;
>>>>> +		goto unlock;
>>>>> +	}
>>>>
>>>> Why is the size of the output buffer enforced here instead of 
>>>> depending on the algorithm implementation?
>>>
>>> akcipher_calcsize calls crypto_akcipher_maxsize to get the maximum 
>>> size the algorithm generates as output during its operation.
>>>
>>> The code ensures that the caller provided at least that amount of memory
>>> for the kernel to store its data in. This check therefore is present to
>>> ensure the kernel does not overstep memory boundaries in user space.
>>
>> Yes, it's understood that the userspace buffer length must not be
>> exceeded. But dst_len is part of the akcipher_request struct, so why does
>> it need to be checked *here* when it is also checked later?
>
> I am always uneasy when the kernel has a user space interface and expects
> layers deep down inside the kernel to check for user space related boundaries.
> Note, we do not hand the __user flag down, so sparse and other tools cannot
> detect whether a particular cipher implementation has the right checks.
>
> I therefore always would like to check parameters at the interface handling
> logic. Cryptographers rightly should worry about their code implementing the
> cipher correctly. But I do not think that the cipher implementations should
> worry about security implications since they may be called from user space.

Userspace or not, buffer lengths need to be strictly checked.

>>
>>> What is your concern?
>>
>> Userspace must allocate larger buffers than it knows are necessary for
>> expected results.
>>
>> It looks like the software rsa implementation handles shorter output
>> buffers ok (mpi_write_to_sgl will return EOVERFLOW if the the buffer is
>> too small), however I see at least one hardware rsa driver that requires
>> the output buffer to be the maximum size. But this inconsistency might be
>> best addressed within the software cipher or drivers rather than in
>> recvmsg.
>
> Is your concern that we have a double check check for lengths here? If yes, I
> think we can live with an additional if() here.
>
> Or is your concern that the user space interface restricts things too much and
> thus prevents a valid use case?

The latter - my primary concern is the constraint this places on userspace 
by forcing larger buffer sizes than might be necessary for the operation. 
struct akcipher_request has separate members for src_len and dst_len, and 
dst_len is documented as needing "to be at least as big as the expected 
result depending on the operation". Not the maximum result, the expected 
result. It's also documented that the cipher will generate an error if 
dst_len is insufficient and update the value with the required size.

I'm updating some userspace TLS code that worked with an earlier, unmerged 
patch set for AF_ALG akcipher (from last year). The read calls with 
shorter buffers were the main porting problem.

--
Mat Martineau
Intel OTC