From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com,
sstabellini@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: remove size limit of privcmd-buf mapping interface
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 15:23:09 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b64f7fa4-a553-bcb4-6051-c91080642b8e@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5BDB0B240200007800142507@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
On 01/11/2018 15:18, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> 11/01/18 1:34 PM >>>
>> Currently the size of hypercall buffers allocated via
>> /dev/xen/hypercall is limited to a default of 64 memory pages. For live
>> migration of guests this might be too small as the page dirty bitmask
>> needs to be sized according to the size of the guest. This means
>> migrating a 8GB sized guest is already exhausting the default buffer
>> size for the dirty bitmap.
>>
>> There is no sensible way to set a sane limit, so just remove it
>> completely. The device node's usage is limited to root anyway, so there
>> is no additional DOS scenario added by allowing unlimited buffers.
>
> But is this setting of permissions what we want long term? What about a
> de-privileged qemu, which still needs to be able to issue at least dm-op
> hypercalls?
Wouldn't that qemu have opened the node while still being privileged?
Juergen
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-01 14:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-01 12:33 [PATCH] xen: remove size limit of privcmd-buf mapping interface Juergen Gross
2018-11-01 14:18 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2018-11-01 14:23 ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2018-11-01 15:50 ` Jan Beulich
[not found] ` <5BDB20AB020000780014251B@suse.com>
2018-11-01 16:27 ` Juergen Gross
2018-11-02 7:26 ` Jan Beulich
2018-11-01 14:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-11-09 7:03 ` Juergen Gross
2018-11-09 14:23 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-11-02 9:53 [Xen-devel] " Juergen Gross
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