From: Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com
Cc: agk@redhat.com, axboe@kernel.dk, snitzer@redhat.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com,
pasha.tatashin@soleen.com, sashal@kernel.org,
jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
mdsakib@linux.microsoft.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2020 17:31:54 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c1466cc8-8a08-708a-4629-234485bb833e@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200406221439.1469862-1-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
On 4/6/20 6:14 PM, deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com wrote:
> From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> Changelog:
> ------------------------------------
>
> v1: Introduced
>
> v2:
> Split the second patch of the previous series into two.
> Minor corrections in the cover-letter and documentation
> comments regarding CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks in IPE.
>
> Overview:
> ------------------------------------
> IPE is a Linux Security Module, which allows for a configurable
> policy to enforce integrity requirements on the whole system. It
> attempts to solve the issue of Code Integrity: that any code being
> executed (or files being read), are identical to the version that
> was built by a trusted source.
Can you please clarify the "motivation" for this patch set more clearly?
It seems to define a policy layer on top of dm-verity, which may be
compiled into the kernel. In the motivation, can you please also make it
explicit why existing mechanisms cannot be extended to achieve your purpose?
Also, AFIK, the changelog should be moved to the end of the patch
description.
Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-07 21:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-06 22:14 [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/12] scripts: add ipe tooling to generate boot policy deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/12] security: add ipe lsm evaluation loop and audit system deven.desai
2020-04-07 12:13 ` Jann Horn
2020-04-09 16:27 ` Deven Bowers
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/12] security: add ipe lsm policy parser and policy loading deven.desai
2020-04-07 15:39 ` Jann Horn
2020-04-09 16:41 ` Deven Bowers
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/12] ipe: add property for trust of boot volume deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/12] fs: add security blob and hooks for block_device deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/12] dm-verity: move signature check after tree validation deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/12] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for dm-verity signature deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/12] ipe: add property for signed dmverity volumes deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/12] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for root-hash deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/12] ipe: add property for dmverity roothash deven.desai
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] documentation: Add IPE Documentation deven.desai
2020-04-14 15:38 ` Jonathan Corbet
2020-04-14 21:18 ` Deven Bowers
2020-04-06 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/12] cleanup: uapi/linux/audit.h deven.desai
2020-04-07 21:31 ` Nayna [this message]
2020-04-09 16:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Deven Bowers
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