From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751289AbdILIL6 (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Sep 2017 04:11:58 -0400 Received: from szxga04-in.huawei.com ([45.249.212.190]:6452 "EHLO szxga04-in.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751110AbdILIL4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Sep 2017 04:11:56 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership To: Juerg Haefliger , Tycho Andersen References: <20170907173609.22696-1-tycho@docker.com> <23e5bac9-329a-3a32-049e-7e7c9751abd0@huawei.com> <20170911150204.nn5v5olbxyzfafou@docker> <60c4ad22-d920-2754-30dd-b1f228c0a87d@huawei.com> <5af82d7a-474f-aba7-d58e-f028627f8723@canonical.com> CC: , , , Marco Benatto From: Yisheng Xie Message-ID: Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2017 16:11:26 +0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.1.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <5af82d7a-474f-aba7-d58e-f028627f8723@canonical.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Originating-IP: [10.177.29.40] X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected X-Mirapoint-Virus-RAPID-Raw: score=unknown(0), refid=str=0001.0A010204.59B796B8.002C,ss=1,re=0.000,recu=0.000,reip=0.000,cl=1,cld=1,fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-11-16 11:51:01, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32 X-Mirapoint-Loop-Id: 1ef831da39dc09ce5127906bb65ca948 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2017/9/12 15:40, Juerg Haefliger wrote: > > > On 09/12/2017 09:07 AM, Yisheng Xie wrote: >> Hi Tycho, >> >> On 2017/9/11 23:02, Tycho Andersen wrote: >>> Hi Yisheng, >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 11, 2017 at 06:34:45PM +0800, Yisheng Xie wrote: >>>> Hi Tycho , >>>> >>>> On 2017/9/8 1:35, Tycho Andersen wrote: >>>>> Hi all, >>>>> >>>>> Here is v6 of the XPFO set; see v5 discussion here: >>>>> https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/8/9/803 >>>>> >>>>> Changelogs are in the individual patch notes, but the highlights are: >>>>> * add primitives for ensuring memory areas are mapped (although these are quite >>>>> ugly, using stack allocation; I'm open to better suggestions) >>>>> * instead of not flushing caches, re-map pages using the above >>>>> * TLB flushing is much more correct (i.e. we're always flushing everything >>>>> everywhere). I suspect we may be able to back this off in some cases, but I'm >>>>> still trying to collect performance numbers to prove this is worth doing. >>>>> >>>>> I have no TODOs left for this set myself, other than fixing whatever review >>>>> feedback people have. Thoughts and testing welcome! >>>> >>>> According to the paper of Vasileios P. Kemerlis et al, the mainline kernel >>>> will not set the Pro. of physmap(direct map area) to RW(X), so do we really >>>> need XPFO to protect from ret2dir attack? >>> >>> I guess you're talking about section 4.3? >> Yes >> >>> They mention that that x86 >>> only gets rw, but that aarch64 is rwx still. >> IIRC, the in kernel of v4.13 the aarch64 is not rwx, I will check it. >> >>> >>> But in either case this still provides access protection, similar to >>> SMAP. Also, if I understand things correctly the protections are >>> unmanaged, so a page that had the +x bit set at some point, it could >>> be used for ret2dir. >> So you means that the Pro. of direct map area maybe changed to +x, then ret2dir attack can use it? > > XPFO protects against malicious reads from userspace (potentially > accessing sensitive data). This sounds reasonable to me. > I've also been told by a security expert that > ROP attacks are still possible even if user space memory is > non-executable. XPFO is supposed to prevent that but I haven't been able > to confirm this. It's way out of my comfort zone. It also quite out of knowledge, and I just try hard to understand it. Thanks so much for your kind explain. And hope some security expert can give some more detail explain? Thanks Yisheng Xie > > ...Juerg