Re: [RESEND PATCH] Allow passing tid or pid in SCM_CREDENTIALS without CAP_SYS_ADMIN

[Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>]

On 8/30/17 10:41 AM, ebiederm@xmission.com wrote:
> Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com> writes:
>
>
>> With regards to security, the question basically is what is the consequence
>> of passing the wrong id. As I understand it, Interpreting the id to be pid
>> or tid, the effective uid and gid will be the same. It would be a problem
>> only if the incorrect interpretation of the id would refer a different process.
>> But that cannot happen as the the global tid(gettid() of a thread is
>> unique.
> There is also the issue that the receiving process could look, not see
> the pid in proc and assume the sending process is dead.  That I suspect
> is the larger danger.
>

Will this not be a bug in the application, if it is sending the wrong id?

>> As long as the thread is alive, that id cannot reference another process / thread.
>> Unless the thread were to exit and the id gets recycled and got used for another
>> thread or process. This would be no different from a process exiting and its
>> pid getting recycled which is the case now.
> Largely I agree.
>
> If all you want are pid translations I suspect the are far easier ways
> thant updating the SCM_CREDENTIALS code.

What would be an another easier & efficient way of doing pid translation?

Should a new API/mechanism be considered mainly for pid translation purpose
for use with pid namespaces, say based on 'pipe' something similar to 
I_SENDFD?

Thanks,
-Prakash.

> Eric
>