From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
To: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 17:09:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cb548aa2-1ac3-46e7-91e4-f57a4fd63754@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220202143128.jgadmr7tzetlobt7@sirius.home.kraxel.org>
On 02/02/2022 16:31, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 01:08:43PM +0200, Dov Murik wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 02/02/2022 10:47, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 12:44:12PM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
>>>> If the efi_secret module is built, register a late_initcall in the EFI
>>>> driver which checks whether the EFI secret area is available and
>>>> populated, and then requests to load the efi_secret module.
>>>
>>>> + area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*area), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>>> + if (!area) {
>>>> + pr_err("Failed to map confidential computing secret area descriptor\n");
>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>> + }
>>>> + if (!area->base_pa || area->size < sizeof(*header_guid))
>>>> + goto unmap_desc;
>>>> +
>>>> + header_guid = (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(area->base_pa, sizeof(*header_guid));
>>>> + if (!header_guid) {
>>>> + pr_err("Failed to map secret area\n");
>>>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>>>> + goto unmap_desc;
>>>> + }
>>>> + if (efi_guidcmp(*header_guid, EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID))
>>>> + goto unmap_encrypted;
>>>
>>> Why these sanity checks are here and not in the efi_secret module?
>>
>> The same checks indeed appear in the efi_secret module (see in patch 3:
>> efi_secret_map_area() and the beginning of efi_secret_securityfs_setup()).
>>
>> However, in the efi_secret module, the checks are noisy, because they
>> expect the secret area to be populated. For example:
>>
>> + if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
>> + pr_err("Secret area address is not available\n");
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
>
> Note I explicitly excluded that check ;)
>
> Checking whenever efi.coco_secret looks valid and only try load
> efi_secret if that is the case (and otherwise stay silent) makes
> perfect sense. The other checks should be dropped IMHO.
>
>> Another approach could be to just try to load the module anyway, and
>> the module will fail (silently? noisily?) if there's no designated
>> secret area or it's not populated. I feel that will be harder to
>> understand what's going on.
>
> I think the module should fail noisily. See above for autoload. In
> case the module is loaded (either manually by the admin, or because
> efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) and it can't actually load
> the secrets we want know why ...
>
Note that the AmdSev build of OVMF always publishes
LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID in the EFI table. Even when
LAUNCH_SECRET was not executed. In such cases the secret area will be
empty.
If we keep only the 'efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR' check,
we'll get errors from efi_secret for every VM launch that doesn't
undergo LAUNCH_SECRET. I don't think that's good.
If we *do* want to check that the area starts with
EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID (like I think we should), we need all the
checks before that, like checking that the area is big enough, and that
all the memremap()s succeed -- before actually comparing the
header_guid. The checks are basically prerequisites for calling
efi_guidcmp() safely.
-Dov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-02 15:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-01 12:44 [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:38 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:41 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:13 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:45 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 10:55 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:47 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:08 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-02 14:31 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 15:09 ` Dov Murik [this message]
2022-02-03 6:16 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-03 11:03 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-03 12:11 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:49 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:19 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 13:50 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Greg KH
2022-02-01 14:24 ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 14:41 ` Greg KH
2022-02-01 15:05 ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 18:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-02 4:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 6:10 ` Greg KH
2022-02-02 6:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 7:05 ` Greg KH
2022-02-02 7:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 7:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-02 8:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 8:25 ` Greg KH
2022-02-09 0:25 ` Nayna
2022-02-02 8:36 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 8:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-07 18:50 ` Dov Murik
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