From: isaku.yamahata@intel.com
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
erdemaktas@google.com, Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 69/69] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 2021 15:05:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cf3d3bff4b1aaf254208434cb430fab155bfa1fd.1625186503.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1625186503.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Add a documentation to Intel Trusted Docmain Extensions(TDX) support.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 6 +-
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 441 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 446 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 7fcb2fd38f42..b6a33a9bac87 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -4297,7 +4297,7 @@ H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
:Capability: basic
:Architectures: x86
-:Type: vm
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
:Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
@@ -4309,6 +4309,10 @@ Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst.
+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Trusted Domain Extensions
+(TDX) commands on Intel Processors. The TDX commands are defined in
+Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst.
+
4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
-----------------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6f2fbd2da243
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================
+Intel Trust Dodmain Extensions(TDX)
+===================================
+
+Overview
+========
+TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions which isolates VMs from
+the virtual-machine manager (VMM)/hypervisor and any other software on
+the platform. [1]
+For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are
+available.
+
+
+API description
+===============
+
+KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+---------------------
+:Type: system ioctl, vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+
+For TDX operations, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP is re-purposed to be generic
+ioctl with TDX specific sub ioctl command.
+
+::
+
+ /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
+ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
+ KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+ KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
+
+ KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
+ __u32 id; /* tdx_cmd_id */
+ __u32 metadata; /* sub comamnd specific */
+ __u64 data; /* sub command specific */
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
+--------------------
+:Type: system ioctl
+
+subset of TDSYSINFO_STRCUCT retrieved by TDH.SYS.INFO TDX SEAM call will be
+returned. which describes about Intel TDX module.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
+- metadata: must be 0
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_capabilities
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config {
+ __u32 leaf;
+ __u32 sub_leaf;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
+ __u64 attrs_fixed0;
+ __u64 attrs_fixed1;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed1;
+
+ __u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
+---------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Does additional VM initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
+TDH.MNG.INIT TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
+- metadata: must be 0
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_vm
+- reserved: must be 0
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+ __u32 max_vcpus;
+ __u32 reserved;
+ __u64 attributes;
+ __u64 cpuid; /* pointer to struct kvm_cpuid2 */
+ __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
+ __u64 reserved[43]; /* must be zero for future extensibility */
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+-----------------
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+
+Does additional VCPU initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
+TDH.VP.INIT TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+- metadata: must be 0
+- data: initial value of the guest TD VCPU RCX
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION
+-----------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Encrypt a memory continuous region which corresponding to TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD
+TDX SEAM call.
+If KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION flag is specified, it also extends measurement
+which corresponds to TDH.MR.EXTEND TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+- metadata: flags
+ currently only KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION is defined
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region
+
+::
+
+ #define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION (1UL << 0)
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+ __u64 source_addr;
+ __u64 gpa;
+ __u64 nr_pages;
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
+-------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Complete measurement of the initial TD contents and mark it ready to run
+which corresponds to TDH.MR.FINALIZE
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
+- metadata: ignored
+- data: ignored
+
+
+KVM TDX creation flow
+=====================
+In addition to KVM normal flow, new TDX ioctls need to be called. The control flow
+looks like as follows.
+
+#. system wide capability check
+ * KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES: query if TDX is supported on the platform.
+ * KVM_CAP_xxx: check other KVM extensions same to normal KVM case.
+
+#. creating VM
+ * KVM_CREATE_VM
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM: pass TDX specific VM parameters.
+
+#. creating VCPU
+ * KVM_CREATE_VCPU
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU: pass TDX specific VCPU parameters.
+
+#. initializing guest memory
+ * allocate guest memory and initialize page same to normal KVM case
+ In TDX case, parse and load TDVF into guest memory in addition.
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION to add and measure guest pages.
+ If the pages has contents above, those pages need to be added.
+ Otherwise the contents will be lost and guest sees zero pages.
+ * KVM_TDX_FINALIAZE_VM: Finalize VM and measurement
+ This must be after KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
+
+#. run vcpu
+
+Loading TDX module
+==================
+
+Integrating TDX SEAM module into initrd
+---------------------------------------
+If TDX is enabled in KVM(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y), kernel is able to load
+tdx seam module from initrd.
+The related modules (seamldr.ac, libtdx.so and libtdx.so.sigstruct) need to be
+stored in initrd.
+
+tdx-seam is a sample hook script for initramfs-tools.
+TDXSEAM_SRCDIR are the directory in the host file system to store files related
+to TDX SEAM module.
+
+Since it heavily depends on distro how to prepare initrd, here's an example how
+to prepare an initrd.
+(Actually this is taken from Documentation/x86/microcode.rst)
+
+::
+
+ #!/bin/bash
+
+ if [ -z "$1" ]; then
+ echo "You need to supply an initrd file"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+
+ INITRD="$1"
+
+ DSTDIR=lib/firmware/intel-seam
+ TMPDIR=/tmp/initrd
+ LIBTDX="/lib/firmware/intel-seam/seamldr.acm /lib/firmware/intel-seam/libtdx.so /lib/firmware/intel-seam/libtdx.so.sigstruct"
+
+ rm -rf $TMPDIR
+
+ mkdir $TMPDIR
+ cd $TMPDIR
+ mkdir -p $DSTDIR
+
+ cp ${LIBTDX} ${DSTDIR}
+
+ find . | cpio -o -H newc > ../tdx-seam.cpio
+ cd ..
+ mv $INITRD $INITRD.orig
+ cat tdx-seam.cpio $INITRD.orig > $INITRD
+
+ rm -rf $TMPDIR
+
+
+Design discussion
+=================
+
+the file location of the boot code
+----------------------------------
+BSP launches SEAM Loader on BSP to load TDX module. TDX module is on
+all CPUs. The directory, arch/x86/kvm/boot/seam, is chosen to locate
+the related files in near directory. When maintenance/enhancement in
+future, it will be easy to identify that they're related to be synced
+with.
+
+- arch/x86/kvm/boot/seam: the current choice
+ Pros:
+ - The directory clearly indicates that the code is related to only KVM.
+ - Keep files near to the related code (KVM TDX code).
+ Cons:
+ - It doesn't follow the existing convention.
+
+Alternative:
+
+The alternative is to follow the existing convention.
+- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/
+ Pros:
+ - It follows the existing convention.
+ Cons:
+ - It's unclear that it's related to only KVM TDX.
+
+- drivers/firmware/
+ As TDX module can be considered a firmware, yet other choice is
+ Pros:
+ - It follows the existing convention. it clarifies that TDX module
+ is a firmware.
+ Cons:
+ - It's hard to understand the firmware is only for KVM TDX.
+ - The files are far from the related code(KVM TDX).
+
+Coexistence of normal(VMX) VM and TD VM
+---------------------------------------
+It's required to allow both legacy(normal VMX) VMs and new TD VMs to
+coexist. Otherwise the benefits of VM flexibility would be eliminated.
+The main issue for it is that the logic of kvm_x86_ops callbacks for
+TDX is different from VMX. On the other hand, the variable,
+kvm_x86_ops, is global single variable. Not per-VM, not per-vcpu.
+
+Several points to be considered.
+ . No or minimal overhead when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=n).
+ . Avoid overhead of indirect call via function pointers.
+ . Contain the changes under arch/x86/kvm/vmx directory and share logic
+ with VMX for maintenance.
+ Even though the ways to operation on VM (VMX instruction vs TDX
+ SEAM call) is different, the basic idea remains same. So, many
+ logic can be shared.
+ . Future maintenance
+ The huge change of kvm_x86_ops in (near) future isn't expected.
+ a centralized file is acceptable.
+
+- Wrapping kvm x86_ops: The current choice
+ Introduce dedicated file for arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c (the name,
+ main.c, is just chosen to show main entry points for callbacks.) and
+ wrapper functions around all the callbacks with
+ "if (is-tdx) tdx-callback() else vmx-callback()".
+
+ Pros:
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code. The change is (mostly)
+ contained under arch/x86/kvm/vmx/.
+ - When TDX is disabled(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=n), the overhead is
+ optimized out.
+ - Micro optimization by avoiding function pointer.
+ Cons:
+ - Many boiler plates in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c.
+
+Alternative:
+- Introduce another callback layer under arch/x86/kvm/vmx.
+ Pros:
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code. The change is (mostly)
+ contained under arch/x86/kvm/vmx/.
+ - clear separation on callbacks.
+ Cons:
+ - overhead in VMX even when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=n).
+
+- Allow per-VM kvm_x86_ops callbacks instead of global kvm_x86_ops
+ Pros:
+ - clear separation on callbacks.
+ Cons:
+ - Big change in common x86 code.
+ - overhead in common code even when TDX is
+ disabled(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=n).
+
+- Introduce new directory arch/x86/kvm/tdx
+ Pros:
+ - It clarifies that TDX is different from VMX.
+ Cons:
+ - Given the level of code sharing, it complicates code sharing.
+
+KVM MMU Changes
+---------------
+KVM MMU needs to be enhanced to handle Secure/Shared-EPT. The
+high-level execution flow is mostly same to normal EPT case.
+EPT violation/misconfiguration -> invoke TDP fault handler ->
+resolve TDP fault -> resume execution. (or emulate MMIO)
+The difference is, that S-EPT is operated(read/write) via TDX SEAM
+call which is expensive instead of direct read/write EPT entry.
+One bit of GPA (51 or 47 bit) is repurposed so that it means shared
+with host(if set to 1) or private to TD(if cleared to 0).
+
+- The current implementation
+ . Reuse the existing MMU code with minimal update. Because the
+ execution flow is mostly same. But additional operation, TDX call
+ for S-EPT, is needed. So add hooks for it to kvm_x86_ops.
+ . For performance, minimize TDX SEAM call to operate on S-EPT. When
+ getting corresponding S-EPT pages/entry from faulting GPA, don't
+ use TDX SEAM call to read S-EPT entry. Instead create shadow copy
+ in host memory.
+ Repurpose the existing kvm_mmu_page as shadow copy of S-EPT and
+ associate S-EPT to it.
+ . Treats share bit as attributes. mask/unmask the bit where
+ necessary to keep the existing traversing code works.
+ Introduce kvm.arch.gfn_shared_mask and use "if (gfn_share_mask)"
+ for special case.
+ = 0 : for non-TDX case
+ = 51 or 47 bit set for TDX case.
+
+ Pros:
+ - Large code reuse with minimal new hooks.
+ - Execution path is same.
+ Cons:
+ - Complicates the existing code.
+ - Repurpose kvm_mmu_page as shadow of Secure-EPT can be confusing.
+
+Alternative:
+- Replace direct read/write on EPT entry with TDX-SEAM call by
+ introducing callbacks on EPT entry.
+ Pros:
+ - Straightforward.
+ Cons:
+ - Too many touching point.
+ - Too slow due to TDX-SEAM call.
+ - Overhead even when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=n).
+
+- Sprinkle "if (is-tdx)" for TDX special case
+ Pros:
+ - Straightforward.
+ Cons:
+ - The result is non-generic and ugly.
+ - Put TDX specific logic into common KVM MMU code.
+
+New KVM API, ioctl (sub)command, to manage TD VMs
+-------------------------------------------------
+Additional KVM API are needed to control TD VMs. The operations on TD
+VMs are specific to TDX.
+
+- Piggyback and repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+ Although not all operation isn't memory encryption, repupose to get
+ TDX specific ioctls.
+ Pros:
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code.
+ Cons:
+ - The operations aren't actually memory encryption, but operations
+ on TD VMs.
+
+Alternative:
+- Introduce new ioctl for guest protection like
+ KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP and introduce subcommand for TDX.
+ Pros:
+ - Clean name.
+ Cons:
+ - One more new ioctl for guest protection.
+ - Confusion with KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP with KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP.
+
+- Rename KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP and keep
+ KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP as same value for user API for compatibility.
+ "#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP" for uapi
+ compatibility.
+ Pros:
+ - No new ioctl with more suitable name.
+ Cons:
+ - May cause confusion to the existing user program.
+
+
+References
+==========
+
+.. [1] TDX specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
+.. [2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-final9-17.pdf
+.. [3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
+.. [4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 EAS
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-module-1eas.pdf
+.. [5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
+.. [6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface.pdf
+.. [7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.
+.. [8] intel public github
+ kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
+ TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
+.. [9] tdvf
+ https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
+.. [10] KVM forum 2020: Intel Virtualization Technology Extensions to
+ Enable Hardware Isolated VMs
+ https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDzm/intel-virtualization-technology-extensions-to-enable-hardware-isolated-vms-sean-christopherson-intel
+.. [11] Linux Security Summit EU 2020:
+ Architectural Extensions for Hardware Virtual Machine Isolation
+ to Advance Confidential Computing in Public Clouds - Ravi Sahita
+ & Jun Nakajima, Intel Corporation
+ https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDOx/architectural-extensions-for-hardware-virtual-machine-isolation-to-advance-confidential-computing-in-public-clouds-ravi-sahita-jun-nakajima-intel-corporation
+.. [12] [RFCv2,00/16] KVM protected memory extension
+ https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/10/20/66
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-02 22:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 175+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-07-02 22:04 [RFC PATCH v2 00/69] KVM: X86: TDX support isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/69] KVM: TDX: introduce config for KVM " isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 12:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 17:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/69] KVM: X86: move kvm_cpu_vmxon() from vmx.c to virtext.h isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 12:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 17:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/69] KVM: X86: move out the definition vmcs_hdr/vmcs from kvm to x86 isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 12:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 18:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/69] KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/69] KVM: TDX: Add architectural definitions for structures and values isaku.yamahata
2021-07-31 1:04 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-08-02 13:25 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-08-04 20:43 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-08-04 23:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/69] KVM: TDX: add a helper function for kvm to call seamcall isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 12:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/69] KVM: TDX: define and export helper functions for KVM TDX support isaku.yamahata
2021-10-09 7:50 ` Wang, Wei W
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/69] KVM: TDX: add trace point before/after TDX SEAMCALLs isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 19:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-13 19:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/69] KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for " isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 19:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/69] KVM: TDX: Print the name of SEAMCALL status code isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/69] KVM: TDX: Introduce pr_seamcall_ex_ret_info() to print more info when SEAMCALL fails isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/69] KVM: Export kvm_io_bus_read for use by TDX for PV MMIO isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:26 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/69] KVM: Enable hardware before doing arch VM initialization isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:26 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/69] KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/69] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmio tracepoint for use by TDX for PV MMIO isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only leaf SPTEs for deleted/moved memslot by default isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/69] KVM: Add infrastructure and macro to mark VM as bugged isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/69] KVM: Export kvm_make_all_cpus_request() for use in marking VMs " isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/69] KVM: x86: Use KVM_BUG/KVM_BUG_ON to handle bugs that are fatal to the VM isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Mark VM as bugged if page fault returns RET_PF_INVALID isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/69] KVM: Add max_vcpus field in common 'struct kvm' isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/69] KVM: x86: Add vm_type to differentiate legacy VMs from protected VMs isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-06 13:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-11-11 3:28 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-11 7:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-11-11 8:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/69] KVM: x86: Hoist kvm_dirty_regs check out of sync_regs() isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/69] KVM: x86: Introduce "protected guest" concept and block disallowed ioctls isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 13:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-20 22:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-11-09 13:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-11-09 17:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-11-10 1:45 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/69] KVM: x86: Add per-VM flag to disable direct IRQ injection isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/69] KVM: x86: Add flag to disallow #MC injection / KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/69] KVM: x86: Add flag to mark TSC as immutable (for TDX) isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/69] KVM: Add per-VM flag to mark read-only memory as unsupported isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-06 19:04 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/69] KVM: Add per-VM flag to disable dirty logging of memslots for TDs isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/69] KVM: x86: Add per-VM flag to disable in-kernel I/O APIC and level routes isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/69] KVM: x86: add per-VM flags to disable SMI/INIT/SIPI isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/69] KVM: x86: Allow host-initiated WRMSR to set X2APIC regardless of CPUID isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 33/69] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops .cache_gprs() and .flush_gprs() isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:10 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 34/69] KVM: x86: Add support for vCPU and device-scoped KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 35/69] KVM: x86: Introduce vm_teardown() hook in kvm_arch_vm_destroy() isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 36/69] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:36 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 37/69] KVM: x86: Check for pending APICv interrupt in kvm_vcpu_has_events() isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 38/69] KVM: x86: Add option to force LAPIC expiration wait isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 39/69] KVM: x86: Add guest_supported_xss placholder isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 40/69] KVM: Export kvm_is_reserved_pfn() for use by TDX isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 41/69] KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for stolen GPA bits isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-05 11:44 ` Kai Huang
2021-08-05 16:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-05 17:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-08-05 17:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-05 18:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-08-05 18:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-05 21:59 ` Kai Huang
2021-08-06 19:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-06 22:00 ` Kai Huang
2021-08-06 22:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-06 22:24 ` Kai Huang
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 42/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly check for MMIO spte in fast page fault isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 43/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-08 15:20 ` Isaku Yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 44/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Refactor shadow walk in __direct_map() to reduce indentation isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 45/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Return old SPTE from mmu_spte_clear_track_bits() isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 46/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Frame in support for private/inaccessible shadow pages isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 47/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Move 'pfn' variable to caller of direct_page_fault() isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 48/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 49/69] KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as param isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 50/69] KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 51/69] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 21:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 52/69] KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:04 ` [RFC PATCH v2 53/69] KVM: VMX: Define EPT Violation architectural bits isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 54/69] KVM: VMX: Define VMCS encodings for shared EPT pointer isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 55/69] KVM: VMX: Add 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-08 15:21 ` Isaku Yamahata
2021-07-08 15:29 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 56/69] KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 57/69] KVM: VMX: Move register caching logic to common code isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 58/69] KVM: TDX: Define TDCALL exit reason isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 59/69] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 60/69] KVM: VMX: Add macro framework to read/write VMCS for VMs and TDs isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 61/69] KVM: VMX: Move AR_BYTES encoder/decoder helpers to common.h isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 62/69] KVM: VMX: MOVE GDT and IDT accessors to common code isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 63/69] KVM: VMX: Move .get_interrupt_shadow() implementation to common VMX code isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 20:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 64/69] cpu/hotplug: Document that TDX also depends on booting CPUs once isaku.yamahata
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 65/69] KVM: X86: Introduce initial_tsc_khz in struct kvm_arch isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-13 18:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-26 5:31 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-07-13 18:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 66/69] KVM: TDX: Add "basic" support for building and running Trust Domains isaku.yamahata
[not found] ` <CAAYXXYyz3S_cc9ohfkUWN4ohrNq5f+h3608CW5twb-n8i=ogBA@mail.gmail.com>
2021-10-21 21:44 ` Sagi Shahar
2021-10-24 12:59 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 67/69] KVM: TDX: add trace point for TDVMCALL and SEPT operation isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 68/69] KVM: TDX: add document on TDX MODULE isaku.yamahata
2021-07-06 14:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-02 22:05 ` isaku.yamahata [this message]
2021-07-06 14:49 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/69] KVM: X86: TDX support Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-06 14:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-26 12:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-07-28 16:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-02 7:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-02 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-02 15:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
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