From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: security@kernel.org
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
yalin wang <yalin.wang2010@gmail.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/2] setgid hardening
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2017 18:49:30 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1485571668.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
The kernel has some dangerous behavior involving the creation and
modification of setgid executables. These issues aren't kernel
security bugs per se, but they have been used to turn various
filesystem permission oddities into reliably privilege escalation
exploits.
See http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/
for a nice writeup.
Let's fix them for real.
Changes from v1:
- Fix uninitialized variable issue (Willy, Ben)
- Also check current creds in should_remove_suid() (Ben)
Andy Lutomirski (2):
fs: Check f_cred as well as of current's creds in should_remove_suid()
fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory
fs/inode.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
fs/internal.h | 2 +-
fs/ocfs2/file.c | 4 ++--
fs/open.c | 2 +-
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
2.9.3
next reply other threads:[~2017-01-28 2:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-28 2:49 Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-01-28 2:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] fs: Check f_cred as well as of current's creds in should_remove_suid() Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-31 3:50 ` Michael Kerrisk
2017-01-31 11:43 ` Jeff Layton
2017-01-28 2:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-31 3:50 ` Michael Kerrisk
2017-01-31 11:43 ` Jeff Layton
2017-01-31 16:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-31 3:49 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] setgid hardening Michael Kerrisk
2017-01-31 3:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
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