From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47FD8C433F5 for ; Mon, 4 Apr 2022 22:02:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S245497AbiDDWDx (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Apr 2022 18:03:53 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46204 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1379252AbiDDQvs (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Apr 2022 12:51:48 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com (mga04.intel.com [192.55.52.120]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1771D2AC68; Mon, 4 Apr 2022 09:49:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1649090991; x=1680626991; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding; bh=8MXmeEOnAKIaAm/x/MYjZ89t2N7BQDgTqvSeXViRrmE=; b=HowJ/8qiROl9dCjh8+77Qfuxm9Z89jOug+DACACMylNhicwXlI3L+7cV GQn/JJ6Eb5w7FHOdnrFCpRfJB33Ux9QSOiI0kPPfgX0NxO5wuv3g+hN+o HE34fj0NL7BwPbb66jzmK9rtpkuDmQ3fm18IsPjea0WgpA3q6pN4pE08g U4i3J4hF9B8+OVJyWYuBPa4RFpacfiE9e+xe3k8IwzriTaQBAvhIqg0uL 88xcKOKVOiS6xWk3WNTCPxW95ILJlfbNpdHZb2BUheZ0R0day1bn0fsAz uV9e6UxB59FVQahT1kGV1T3lu0NYEOviPpAflVRsr5KFKNDGZXXwThC2N Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10307"; a="259390759" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,234,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="259390759" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Apr 2022 09:49:50 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,234,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="523105148" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Apr 2022 09:49:50 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V3 00/30] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 09:49:08 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org V2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/ Changes since V2 that directly impact user space: - Maximum allowed permissions of dynamically added pages is RWX, previously limited to RW. (Jarkko) Dynamically added pages are initially created with architecturally limited EPCM permissions of RW. mmap() and mprotect() of these pages with RWX permissions would no longer be blocked by SGX driver. PROT_EXEC on dynamically added pages will be possible after running ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave with appropriate VMA permissions. - The kernel no longer attempts to track the EPCM runtime permissions. (Jarkko) Consequences are: - Kernel does not modify PTEs to follow EPCM permissions. User space will receive #PF with SGX error code in cases where the V2 implementation would have resulted in regular (non-SGX) page fault error code. - SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS is removed. This ioctl() was used to clear PTEs after permissions were modified from within the enclave and ensure correct PTEs are installed. Since PTEs no longer track EPCM permissions the changes in EPCM permissions would not impact PTEs. As long as new permissions are within the maximum vetted permissions (vm_max_prot_bits) only ENCLU[EMODPE] from within enclave is needed, as accompanied by appropriate VMA permissions. - struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm renamed to sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions (Jarkko) - struct sgx_enclave_modt renamed to struct sgx_enclave_modify_type to be consistent with the verbose naming of other SGX uapi structs. Details about changes since V2 that do not directly impact user space: - Kernel no longer tracks the runtime EPCM permissions with the aim of installing accurate PTEs. (Jarkko) - In support of this change the following patches were removed: Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions - No more handling of scenarios where VMA permissions may be more relaxed than what the EPCM allows. Enclaves are not prevented from accessing such pages and the EPCM permissions are entrusted to control access as supported by the SGX error code in page faults. - No more explicit setting of protection bits in page fault handler. Protection bits are inherited from VMA similar to SGX1 support. - Selftest patches are moved to the end of the series. (Jarkko) - New patch contributed by Jarkko to avoid duplicated code: x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc() - New patch separating changes from existing patch. (Jarkko) x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_{grow,shrink}() - New patch to keep one required benefit from the (now removed) kernel EPCM permission tracking: x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check - Updated cover letter to reflect architecture changes. - Many smaller changes, please refer to individual patches. V1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/cover.1638381245.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com/ Changes since V1 that directly impact user space: - SGX2 permission changes changed from a single ioctl() named SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP to two new ioctl()s: SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, supported by two different parameter structures (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS does not support a result output parameter) (Jarkko). User space flow impact: After user space runs ENCLU[EMODPE] it needs to call SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to have PTEs updated. Previously running SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODP in this scenario resulted in EPCM.PR being set but calling SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS will not result in EPCM.PR being set anymore and thus no need for an additional ENCLU[EACCEPT]. - SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS obtain new permissions from secinfo as parameter instead of the permissions directly (Jarkko). - ioctl() supporting SGX2 page type change is renamed from SGX_IOC_PAGE_MODT to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (Jarkko). - SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE obtains new page type from secinfo as parameter instead of the page type directly (Jarkko). - ioctl() supporting SGX2 page removal is renamed from SGX_IOC_PAGE_REMOVE to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES (Jarkko). - All ioctl() parameter structures have been renamed as a result of the ioctl() renaming: SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS => struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS => struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE => struct sgx_enclave_modt SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES => struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages Changes since V1 that do not directly impact user space: - Number of patches in series increased from 25 to 32 primarily because of splitting the original submission: - Wrappers for the new SGX2 functions are introduced in three separate patches replacing the original "x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions" (Jarkko). - Moving and renaming sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is done with two patches replacing the original "x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function" (Jarkko). - Support for SGX2 EPCM permission changes is split into two ioctls(), one for relaxing and one for restricting permissions, each introduced by a new patch replacing the original "x86/sgx: Support enclave page permission changes" (Jarkko). - Extracted code used by existing ioctls() for usage by new ioctl()s into a new utility in new patch "x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length" (Dave did not specifically ask for this but it addresses his review feedback). - Two new Documentation patches to support the SGX2 work ("Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management") and a dedicated section on the enclave permission management ("Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details") (Andy). - Most patches were reworked to improve the language by: * aiming to refer to exact item instead of English rephrasing (Jarkko). * use ioctl() instead of ioctl throughout (Dave). * Use "relaxed" instead of "exceed" when referring to permissions (Dave). - Improved documentation with several additions to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst. - Many smaller changes, please refer to individual patches. Hi Everybody, The current Linux kernel support for SGX includes support for SGX1 that requires that an enclave be created with properties that accommodate all usages over its (the enclave's) lifetime. This includes properties such as permissions of enclave pages, the number of enclave pages, and the number of threads supported by the enclave. Consequences of this requirement to have the enclave be created to accommodate all usages include: * pages needing to support relocated code are required to have RWX permissions for their entire lifetime, * an enclave needs to be created with the maximum stack and heap projected to be needed during the enclave's entire lifetime which can be longer than the processes running within it, * an enclave needs to be created with support for the maximum number of threads projected to run in the enclave. Since SGX1 a few more functions were introduced, collectively called SGX2, that support modifications to an initialized enclave. Hardware supporting these functions are already available as listed on https://github.com/ayeks/SGX-hardware This series adds support for SGX2, also referred to as Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM). This includes: * Support modifying EPCM permissions of regular enclave pages belonging to an initialized enclave. Only permission restriction is supported via a new ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS. Relaxing of EPCM permissions can only be done from within the enclave with ENCLU[EMODPE]. * Support dynamic addition of regular enclave pages to an initialized enclave. At creation new pages are architecturally limited to RW EPCM permissions but will be accessible with PROT_EXEC after the enclave runs ENCLU[EMODPE] to relax EPCM permissions to RWX. Pages are dynamically added to an initialized enclave from the SGX page fault handler. * Support expanding an initialized enclave to accommodate more threads. More threads can be accommodated by an enclave with the addition of Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages that is done by changing the type of regular enclave pages to TCS pages using a new ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE. * Support removing regular and TCS pages from an initialized enclave. Removing pages is accomplished in two stages as supported by two new ioctl()s SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPE (same ioctl() as mentioned in previous bullet) and SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES. * Tests covering all the new flows, some edge cases, and one comprehensive stress scenario. No additional work is needed to support SGX2 in a virtualized environment. All tests included in this series passed when run from a guest as tested with the recent QEMU release based on 6.2.0 that supports SGX. Patches 1 to 13 prepare the existing code for SGX2 support by introducing the SGX2 functions, refactoring code, and tracking enclave page types. Patches 14 through 20 enable the SGX2 features and include a Documentation patch. Patches 21 through 30 test several scenarios of all the enabled SGX2 features. This series is based on v5.17 with the following fixes that have already been merged for inclusion into v5.18-rc1. These can be obtained from the x86/sgx branch of tip.git. commit 2d03861e0d1d ("selftests/sgx: Fix NULL-pointer-dereference upon early test failure") commit fff36bcbfde1 ("selftests/sgx: Do not attempt enclave build without valid enclave") commit 2db703fc3b15 ("selftests/sgx: Ensure enclave data available during debug print") commit 5626de65f97a ("selftests/sgx: Remove extra newlines in test output") commit b06e15ebd5bf ("selftests/x86: Add validity check and allow field splitting") commit 6170abb21e23 ("selftests/sgx: Treat CC as one argument") Your feedback will be greatly appreciated. Regards, Reinette Jarkko Sakkinen (1): x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc() Reinette Chatre (29): x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_{grow,shrink}() x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type x86/sgx: Support complete page removal x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page permission changes selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 15 + arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 62 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 330 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 13 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 33 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 668 +++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 70 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 23 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 41 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 1456 +++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 68 + .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 6 + 15 files changed, 2675 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-) base-commit: f443e374ae131c168a065ea1748feac6b2e76613 prerequisite-patch-id: 986260c8bc4255eb61e2c4afa88d2b723e376423 prerequisite-patch-id: ba014a99fced2b57d5d9e2dfb9d80ddf4333c13e prerequisite-patch-id: 65cbb72889b6353a5639b984615d12019136b270 prerequisite-patch-id: e3296a2f0345a77c8a7ca91f76697ae2e1dca21f prerequisite-patch-id: 0e792adec49b53020ee788fd0126e8f015ff483d prerequisite-patch-id: b8685cf66d49f89ed7444feafa0129aa6144a163 -- 2.25.1