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From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, fenghua.yu@intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com, jithu.joseph@intel.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH V4 21/38] x86/intel_rdt: Utilities to restrict/restore access to specific files
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 04:29:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d7a017c82185e91b3968309db623e62e862121d5.1526987654.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1526987654.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1526987654.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com>

In support of Cache Pseudo-Locking we need to restrict access to
specific resctrl files to protect the state of a resource group used for
pseudo-locking from being changed in unsupported ways.

Introduce two utilities that can be used to either restrict or restore
the access to all files irrelevant to cache pseudo-locking when
pseudo-locking in progress for the resource group.

At this time introduce a new source file, intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c, that
will contain most of the code related to cache pseudo-locking.

Temporarily mark these new functions as unused to silence compile
warnings until they are used.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile                |   3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
index a66229f51b12..071f50162727 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CENTAUR)		+= centaur.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_TRANSMETA_32)	+= transmeta.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_UMC_32)		+= umc.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_RDT)	+= intel_rdt.o intel_rdt_rdtgroup.o intel_rdt_monitor.o intel_rdt_ctrlmondata.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_RDT)	+= intel_rdt.o intel_rdt_rdtgroup.o intel_rdt_monitor.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_RDT)	+= intel_rdt_ctrlmondata.o intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE)			+= mcheck/
 obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR)			+= mtrr/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dc79b3090ac5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Resource Director Technology (RDT)
+ *
+ * Pseudo-locking support built on top of Cache Allocation Technology (CAT)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "intel_rdt.h"
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict - Restrict user access to group
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group needing access restricted
+ *
+ * A resource group used for cache pseudo-locking cannot have cpus or tasks
+ * assigned to it. This is communicated to the user by restricting access
+ * to all the files that can be used to make such changes.
+ *
+ * Permissions restored with rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore()
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure. If a failure occurs during the
+ * restriction of access an attempt will be made to restore permissions but
+ * the state of the mode of these files will be uncertain when a failure
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static int __attribute__ ((unused))
+rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "tasks");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus");
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_tasks;
+
+	ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus_list");
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_cpus;
+
+	if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+		ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "mon_groups");
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_cpus_list;
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+err_cpus_list:
+	rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus_list");
+err_cpus:
+	rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus");
+err_tasks:
+	rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "tasks");
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore - Restore user access to group
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group needing access restored
+ *
+ * Restore all file access previously removed using
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict()
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure.  If a failure occurs during the
+ * restoration of access an attempt will be made to restrict permissions
+ * again but the state of the mode of these files will be uncertain when
+ * a failure occurs.
+ */
+static int __attribute__ ((unused))
+rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "tasks");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus");
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_tasks;
+
+	ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus_list");
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_cpus;
+
+	if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+		ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "mon_groups");
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_cpus_list;
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+err_cpus_list:
+	rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus_list");
+err_cpus:
+	rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus");
+err_tasks:
+	rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "tasks");
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
-- 
2.13.6

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-22 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-22 11:28 [PATCH V4 00/38] Intel(R) Resource Director Technology Cache Pseudo-Locking enabling Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 01/38] x86/intel_rdt: Document new mode, size, and bit_usage Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 02/38] x86/intel_rdt: Introduce RDT resource group mode Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 03/38] x86/intel_rdt: Associate mode with each RDT resource group Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 04/38] x86/intel_rdt: Introduce resource group's mode resctrl file Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 05/38] x86/intel_rdt: Introduce test to determine if closid is in use Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 06/38] x86/intel_rdt: Make useful functions available internally Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 07/38] x86/intel_rdt: Initialize new resource group with sane defaults Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 08/38] x86/intel_rdt: Introduce new "exclusive" mode Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 09/38] x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 10/38] x86/intel_rdt: Making CBM name and type more explicit Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:28 ` [PATCH V4 11/38] x86/intel_rdt: Support flexible data to parsing callbacks Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 12/38] x86/intel_rdt: Ensure requested schemata respects mode Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 13/38] x86/intel_rdt: Introduce "bit_usage" to display cache allocations details Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 21:03   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-22 21:09     ` Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 14/38] x86/intel_rdt: Display resource groups' allocations' size in bytes Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 15/38] x86/intel_rdt: Documentation for Cache Pseudo-Locking Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 16/38] x86/intel_rdt: Introduce the Cache Pseudo-Locking modes Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 17/38] x86/intel_rdt: Respect read and write access Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 18/38] x86/intel_rdt: Add utility to test if tasks assigned to resource group Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 19/38] x86/intel_rdt: Add utility to restrict/restore access to resctrl files Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 20/38] x86/intel_rdt: Protect against resource group changes during locking Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` Reinette Chatre [this message]
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 22/38] x86/intel_rdt: Add check to determine if monitoring in progress Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 23/38] x86/intel_rdt: Introduce pseudo-locked region Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 24/38] x86/intel_rdt: Support enter/exit of locksetup mode Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 25/38] x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 26/38] x86/intel_rdt: Split resource group removal in two Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 27/38] x86/intel_rdt: Add utilities to test pseudo-locked region possibility Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 28/38] x86/intel_rdt: Discover supported platforms via prefetch disable bits Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 29/38] x86/intel_rdt: Pseudo-lock region creation/removal core Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 30/38] x86/intel_rdt: Support creation/removal of pseudo-locked region Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 31/38] x86/intel_rdt: resctrl files reflect pseudo-locked information Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 32/38] x86/intel_rdt: Ensure RDT cleanup on exit Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 33/38] x86/intel_rdt: Create resctrl debug area Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 34/38] x86/intel_rdt: Create debugfs files for pseudo-locking testing Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 19:43   ` Greg KH
2018-05-22 21:02     ` Reinette Chatre
2018-05-23  8:05       ` Greg KH
2018-05-23 17:19         ` Reinette Chatre
2018-05-23 17:27           ` Greg KH
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 35/38] x86/intel_rdt: Create character device exposing pseudo-locked region Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 36/38] x86/intel_rdt: More precise L2 hit/miss measurements Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 37/38] x86/intel_rdt: Support L3 cache performance event of Broadwell Reinette Chatre
2018-05-22 11:29 ` [PATCH V4 38/38] x86/intel_rdt: Limit C-states dynamically when pseudo-locking active Reinette Chatre

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