On 15.12.20 08:27, Jürgen Groß wrote: > On 14.12.20 22:25, Julien Grall wrote: >> Hi Juergen, >> >> When testing Linux 5.10 dom0, I could reliably hit the following >> warning with using event 2L ABI: >> >> [  589.591737] Interrupt for port 34, but apparently not enabled; >> per-user 00000000a86a4c1b >> [  589.593259] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1111 at >> /home/ANT.AMAZON.COM/jgrall/works/oss/linux/drivers/xen/evtchn.c:170 >> evtchn_interrupt+0xeb/0x100 >> [  589.595514] Modules linked in: >> [  589.596145] CPU: 0 PID: 1111 Comm: qemu-system-i38 Tainted: G >> W         5.10.0+ #180 >> [  589.597708] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), >> BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 >> [  589.599782] RIP: e030:evtchn_interrupt+0xeb/0x100 >> [  589.600698] Code: 48 8d bb d8 01 00 00 ba 01 00 00 00 be 1d 00 00 >> 00 e8 d9 10 ca ff eb b2 8b 75 20 48 89 da 48 c7 c7 a8 31 3d 82 e8 65 >> 29 a0 ff <0f> 0b e9 42 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 >> 00 0f >> [  589.604087] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040003e70 EFLAGS: 00010086 >> [  589.605102] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102091800 RCX: >> 0000000000000027 >> [  589.606445] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88817fe19150 RDI: >> ffff88817fe19158 >> [  589.607790] RBP: ffff88810f5ab980 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: >> 0000000000328980 >> [  589.609134] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffc90040003c70 R12: >> ffff888107fd3c00 >> [  589.610484] R13: ffffc90040003ed4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: >> ffff88810f5ffd80 >> [  589.611828] FS:  00007f960c4b8ac0(0000) GS:ffff88817fe00000(0000) >> knlGS:0000000000000000 >> [  589.613348] CS:  10000e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 >> [  589.614525] CR2: 00007f17ee72e000 CR3: 000000010f5b6000 CR4: >> 0000000000050660 >> [  589.615874] Call Trace: >> [  589.616402]  >> [  589.616855]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4e/0x2c0 >> [  589.617784]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80 >> [  589.618660]  handle_irq_event+0x3a/0x60 >> [  589.619428]  handle_edge_irq+0x9b/0x1f0 >> [  589.620209]  generic_handle_irq+0x4f/0x60 >> [  589.621008]  evtchn_2l_handle_events+0x160/0x280 >> [  589.621913]  __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x66/0xb0 >> [  589.622767]  __xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall+0x11/0x20 >> [  589.623665]  asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 >> [  589.624511]  >> [  589.624978]  xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall+0x77/0xf0 >> [  589.625848]  exc_xen_hypervisor_callback+0x8/0x10 >> >> This can be reproduced when creating/destroying guest in a loop. >> Although, I have struggled to reproduce it on a vanilla Xen. >> >> After several hours of debugging, I think I have found the root cause. >> >> While we only expect the unmask to happen when the event channel is >> EOIed, there is an unmask happening as part of handle_edge_irq() >> because the interrupt was seen as pending by another vCPU >> (IRQS_PENDING is set). >> >> It turns out that the event channel is set for multiple vCPU is in >> cpu_evtchn_mask. This is happening because the affinity is not cleared >> when freeing an event channel. >> >> The implementation of evtchn_2l_handle_events() will look for all the >> active interrupts for the current vCPU and later on clear the pending >> bit (via the ack() callback). IOW, I believe, this is not an atomic >> operation. >> >> Even if Xen will notify the event to a single vCPU, evtchn_pending_sel >> may still be set on the other vCPU (thanks to a different event >> channel). Therefore, there is a chance that two vCPUs will try to >> handle the same interrupt. >> >> The IRQ handler handle_edge_irq() is able to deal with that and will >> mask/unmask the interrupt. This will mess us with the lateeoi logic >> (although, I managed to reproduce it once without XSA-332). > > Thanks for the analysis! > >> My initial idea to fix the problem was to switch the affinity from CPU >> X to CPU0 when the event channel is freed. >> >> However, I am not sure this is enough because I haven't found anything >> yet preventing a race between evtchn_2l_handle_events9) and >> evtchn_2l_bind_vcpu(). >> >> So maybe we want to introduce a refcounting (if there is nothing >> provided by the IRQ framework) and only unmask when the counter drop >> to 0. >> >> Any opinions? > > I think we don't need a refcount, but just the internal states "masked" > and "eoi_pending" and unmask only if both are false. "masked" will be > set when the event is being masked. When delivering a lateeoi irq > "eoi_pending" will be set and "masked "reset. "masked" will be reset > when a normal unmask is happening. And "eoi_pending" will be reset > when a lateeoi is signaled. Any reset of "masked" and "eoi_pending" > will check the other flag and do an unmask if both are false. > > I'll write a patch. Julien, could you please test the attached (only build tested) patch? Juergen