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From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	ruscur@russell.cc
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/10] powerpc/32s: Implement Kernel Userspace Access Protection
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 11:26:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e297ba05-e82d-d269-20d2-5bd3914b1d14@c-s.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ftqfu7j1.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>



Le 18/04/2019 à 08:55, Michael Ellerman a écrit :
> Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> writes:
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/kup.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/kup.h
>> index 5f97c742ca71..b3560b2de435 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/kup.h
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/kup.h
>> @@ -37,6 +37,113 @@
> ...
>> +
>> +static inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from, u32 size)
>> +{
>> +	u32 addr = (__force u32)to;
>> +	u32 end = min(addr + size, TASK_SIZE);
>> +
>> +	if (!addr || addr >= TASK_SIZE || !size)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	current->thread.kuap = (addr & 0xf0000000) | ((((end - 1) >> 28) + 1) & 0xf);
>> +	kuap_update_sr(mfsrin(addr) & ~SR_KS, addr, end);	/* Clear Ks */
>> +}
> 
> When rebasing on my v6 I changed the above to:
> 
> static inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from, u32 size)
> {
> 	u32 addr, end;
> 
> 	if (__builtin_constant_p(to) && to == NULL)
> 		return;

Good point, it avoids keeping the test compiled in when the 'to' is not 
NULL.

> 
> 	addr = (__force u32)to;
> 
> 	if (!addr || addr >= TASK_SIZE || !size)
> 		return;

Then the !addr test isn't needed anymore I think.

Christophe

> 
> 	end = min(addr + size, TASK_SIZE);
> 	current->thread.kuap = (addr & 0xf0000000) | ((((end - 1) >> 28) + 1) & 0xf);
> 	kuap_update_sr(mfsrin(addr) & ~SR_KS, addr, end);	/* Clear Ks */
> }
> 
> Which I think achieves the same result. It does boot :)
> 
>> +
>> +static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from, u32 size)
>> +{
>> +	u32 addr = (__force u32)to;
>> +	u32 end = min(addr + size, TASK_SIZE);
>> +
>> +	if (!addr || addr >= TASK_SIZE || !size)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	current->thread.kuap = 0;
>> +	kuap_update_sr(mfsrin(addr) | SR_KS, addr, end);	/* set Ks */
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void allow_read_from_user(const void __user *from, unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +}
> 
> And I dropped that.
> 
> cheers
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-23  9:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-11  8:30 [PATCH v2 00/10] Kernel Userspace protection for PPC32 Christophe Leroy
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] powerpc/6xx: fix setup and use of SPRN_SPRG_PGDIR for hash32 Christophe Leroy
2019-03-20 13:04   ` [v2, " Michael Ellerman
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] powerpc/mm: Detect bad KUAP faults (Squash of v5 series) Christophe Leroy
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] powerpc/32: Remove MSR_PR test when returning from syscall Christophe Leroy
2019-04-21 14:18   ` [v2, " Michael Ellerman
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] powerpc/32: Prepare for Kernel Userspace Access Protection Christophe Leroy
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] powerpc/8xx: Only define APG0 and APG1 Christophe Leroy
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] powerpc/8xx: Add Kernel Userspace Execution Prevention Christophe Leroy
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] powerpc/8xx: Add Kernel Userspace Access Protection Christophe Leroy
2019-04-18  6:53   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] powerpc/32s: Implement Kernel Userspace Execution Prevention Christophe Leroy
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] powerpc/32s: Prepare Kernel Userspace Access Protection Christophe Leroy
2019-03-11  8:30 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] powerpc/32s: Implement " Christophe Leroy
2019-04-18  6:55   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-23  9:26     ` Christophe Leroy [this message]
2020-01-21 17:22     ` GCC bug ? " Christophe Leroy
2020-01-21 19:55       ` Segher Boessenkool
2020-01-22  6:52         ` Christophe Leroy
2020-01-22 13:36           ` Segher Boessenkool
2020-01-22 14:45             ` Christophe Leroy
2020-01-22  6:57         ` Christophe Leroy
2020-01-22 13:18           ` Segher Boessenkool

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