From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 10:59:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e36e964567beed0a2769d84c8d4144870e922655.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Mark the non-dumpable processes with TIF_STIBP flag so they will
use STIBP and IBPB defenses against Spectre v2 attack from
processes in user space.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1d317f2..cc77b9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -773,6 +774,26 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
}
}
+void arch_set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int value)
+{
+ bool update;
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
+ return;
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ return;
+ if (spectre_v2_app2app_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ if (tsk->mm && value != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
+ else
+ update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
+
+ if (tsk == current && update)
+ speculation_ctrl_update_current();
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
{
--
2.9.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-17 18:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:15 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-28 9:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:18 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:21 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-18 15:17 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
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