From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
Date: Thu, 09 Sep 2021 16:58:52 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e56b14a494ec35989372f505264cc68e9352c8b9.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210907160110.2699645-13-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end-
> user wants to trust the machine keyring as trusted keys. If they have
> chosen to trust the machine keyring, load the qualifying keys into it
> during boot, then link it to the secondary keyring . If the user has not
> chosen to trust the machine keyring, it will be empty and not linked to
> the secondary keyring.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
I would not worry too much applying the code changes if the story
part made sense (to *almost anyone*) in the cover letter.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-09 14:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-07 16:00 [PATCH v5 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:00 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-09 15:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 17:32 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-09 17:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 17:53 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 18:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 17:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 18:03 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 18:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 17:27 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-09-08 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 16:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 22:25 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-08 17:09 ` Eric Snowberg
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