From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2024 09:56:38 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <eadcab6f-b533-49e3-9aec-dc06036327f5@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240422131459.GAZiZi0wUtpx2r0M6-@fat_crate.local>
On 4/22/2024 6:44 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 05:01:19PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api
>
> s/api/API/g
>
> Please check your whole patchset for proper naming/abbreviations
> spelling, etc.
>
> Another one: s/sev/SEV/g and so on. You should know the drill by now.
Sure.
>> For enabling Secure TSC, SEV-SNP guests need to communicate with the
>> AMD Security Processor early during boot. Many of the required
>> functions are implemented in the sev-guest driver and therefore not
>> available at early boot. Move the required functions and provide
>> API to the sev guest driver for sending guest message and vmpck
>> routines.
>
> Patches which move and reorganize must always be split: first patch(es):
> you do *purely* *mechanical* move without any code changes.
Yes, I had tried that compilation/guest boot does not break at this stage.
That was the reason for intermixing movement and code change.
Let me give a second stab at this and I will try just to make sure compilation does not break.
> Then you do the code changes ontop so that a reviewer can have a chance of seeing
> what you're doing.
Sure
Regards,
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-23 4:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-15 11:31 [PATCH v8 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 22:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-29 9:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-28 11:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-29 9:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-09 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-16 5:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-16 9:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 4:18 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-16 14:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 5:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-17 7:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:22 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 10:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 10:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 11:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-04-23 13:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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