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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"# 4 . 15 . x" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Access EFI MMIO data as unencrypted when SEV is active
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 15:50:33 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ec20e072-2162-2555-758d-38c98276f4fa@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1530624720-32004-1-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On 7/3/2018 8:32 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
> flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
> when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
> as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked
> as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both
> guest and hypervisor can access the data.
> 
> Fixes: 1379edd59673 (x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...)
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.15.x
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

> ---
>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> index 77873ce..5f2eb32 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
>  	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
>  		flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
>  
> -	if (sev_active())
> +	if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
>  		flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
>  
>  	pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-07-03 20:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-03 13:32 [PATCH] x86/efi: Access EFI MMIO data as unencrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2018-07-03 15:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-03 15:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-07-03 21:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-07-03 21:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-07-03 22:40         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-03 20:50 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2018-07-11 10:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-16 19:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2018-07-17  3:12     ` Ard Biesheuvel

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