From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero" <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
To: "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
tglx@linutronix.de, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, x86@kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 14:12:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f2faf9ff-8955-d8b5-c521-91b9c273128b@maciej.szmigiero.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515779365-9032-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
On 12.01.2018 18:49, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> When we context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as we
> 'ret' up the deeper side we may encounter RSB entries (predictions for
> where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace. This is
> problematic if we have neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks
> userspace pages as NX for the kernel), as malicious code in userspace
> may then be executed speculatively. So overwrite the CPU's return
> prediction stack with calls which are predicted to return to an infinite
> loop, to "capture" speculation if this happens. This is required both
> for retpoline, and also in conjunction with IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI.
>
> On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the
> RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so
> much overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting
> empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many
> other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full
> solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even
> when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be
> required on context switch.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> ---
(..)
> @@ -213,6 +230,23 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>
> spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
> pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
> +
> + /*
> + * If we don't have SMEP or KPTI, then we run the risk of hitting
> + * userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch from a
> + * shallow call stack to a deeper one. We must must fill the entire
> + * RSB to avoid that, even when using IBRS.
> + *
> + * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
> + * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
> + * IBRS makes that safe, but we need to fill the RSB on context
> + * switch if we're using retpoline.
> + */
> + if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
> + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
> + pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
> + }
Shouldn't the RSB filling on context switch also be done on non-IBPB
CPUs to protect (retpolined) user space tasks from other user space
tasks?
We already issue a IBPB when switching to high-value user space tasks
to protect them from other user space tasks.
Thanks,
Maciej
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-09 13:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-12 17:49 [PATCH] x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 18:02 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-12 18:23 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 18:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:56 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 23:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-14 11:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-14 17:04 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 14:35 ` David Laight
2018-01-15 14:39 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 14:42 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-15 20:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-14 23:37 ` tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 0:05 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-15 0:09 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-15 10:13 ` David Woodhouse
2018-03-09 13:12 ` Maciej S. Szmigiero [this message]
2018-03-09 15:14 ` Andi Kleen
2018-03-09 15:33 ` Maciej S. Szmigiero
2018-03-09 15:38 ` Woodhouse, David
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