From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] crypto: ccp: Detect and reject vmalloc addresses destined for PSP
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 2021 08:31:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f731c2f3-7a51-47d6-bdb2-cfefd07b6abd@csgroup.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210402233702.3291792-2-seanjc@google.com>
Le 03/04/2021 à 01:36, Sean Christopherson a écrit :
> Explicitly reject vmalloc'd data as the source for SEV commands that are
> sent to the PSP. The PSP works with physical addresses, and __pa() will
> not return the correct address for a vmalloc'd pionter, which at best
> will cause the command to fail, and at worst lead to system instability.
>
> While it's unlikely that callers will deliberately use vmalloc() for SEV
> buffers, a caller can easily use a vmalloc'd pointer unknowingly when
> running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y as it's not obvious that putting the
> command buffers on the stack would be bad. The command buffers are
> relative small and easily fit on the stack, and the APIs to do not
> document that the incoming pointer must be a physically contiguous,
> __pa() friendly pointer.
>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> index cb9b4c4e371e..6556d220713b 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> @@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
>
> sev = psp->sev_data;
>
> + if (data && WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vmalloc_addr(data)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
I hadn't seen this patch when I commented the 2 other ones, I received it only this night.
As commented in the other patches, is_vmalloc_addr() is not the best way to test that __pa() can be
safely used.
For that, you have virt_addr_valid()
> /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
> phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
> phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-04 6:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-02 23:36 [PATCH 0/5] ccp: KVM: SVM: Use stack for SEV command buffers Sean Christopherson
2021-04-02 23:36 ` [PATCH 1/5] crypto: ccp: Detect and reject vmalloc addresses destined for PSP Sean Christopherson
2021-04-04 6:31 ` Christophe Leroy [this message]
2021-04-02 23:36 ` [PATCH 2/5] crypto: ccp: Reject SEV commands with mismatching command buffer Sean Christopherson
2021-04-03 17:02 ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-05 16:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-05 16:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-05 16:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-02 23:37 ` [PATCH 3/5] crypto: ccp: Play nice with vmalloc'd memory for SEV command structs Sean Christopherson
2021-04-03 17:05 ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-03 17:13 ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-04 6:48 ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-05 15:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-05 16:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-02 23:37 ` [PATCH 4/5] crypto: ccp: Use the stack for small SEV command buffers Sean Christopherson
2021-04-02 23:37 ` [PATCH 5/5] KVM: SVM: Allocate SEV command structures on local stack Sean Christopherson
2021-04-04 19:54 ` [PATCH 0/5] ccp: KVM: SVM: Use stack for SEV command buffers Brijesh Singh
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