From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: "kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Michael Kelley" <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
"Roman Kagan" <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] KVM: x86: hyper-v: set NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing CPUID bit when SMT is impossible
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 16:08:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fae07d28-e7de-1ed1-c6d4-513884a97c2f@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ef0fb72x.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com>
On 17/09/19 11:33, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> writes:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 9:23 AM Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hyper-V 2019 doesn't expose MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests when it cannot
>>> guarantee that two virtual processors won't end up running on sibling SMT
>>> threads without knowing about it. This is done as an optimization as in
>>> this case there is nothing the guest can do to protect itself against MDS
>>> and issuing additional flush requests is just pointless. On bare metal the
>>> topology is known, however, when Hyper-V is running nested (e.g. on top of
>>> KVM) it needs an additional piece of information: a confirmation that the
>>> exposed topology (wrt vCPU placement on different SMT threads) is
>>> trustworthy.
>>>
>>> NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing (CPUID 0x40000004 EAX bit 18) is described in
>>> TLFS as follows: "Indicates that a virtual processor will never share a
>>> physical core with another virtual processor, except for virtual processors
>>> that are reported as sibling SMT threads." From KVM we can give such
>>> guarantee in two cases:
>>> - SMT is unsupported or forcefully disabled (just 'disabled' doesn't work
>>> as it can become re-enabled during the lifetime of the guest).
>>> - vCPUs are properly pinned so the scheduler won't put them on sibling
>>> SMT threads (when they're not reported as such).
>>
>> That's a nice bit of information. Have you considered a mechanism for
>> communicating this information to kvm guests in a way that doesn't
>> require Hyper-V enlightenments?
>>
>
> (I haven't put much thought in this) but can we re-use MD_CLEAR CPUID
> bit for that? Like if the hypervisor can't guarantee usefulness
> (e.g. when two random vCPUs can be put on sibling SMT threads) of
> flushing, is there any reason to still make the guest think the feature
> is there?
Yes, that's a good idea.
Paolo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-17 14:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-16 16:22 [PATCH 0/3] KVM: x86: hyper-v: make L2 Hyper-V 2019 on KVM guests see MD_CLEAR Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-09-16 16:22 ` [PATCH 1/3] cpu/SMT: create and export cpu_smt_possible() Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-09-16 17:16 ` Jim Mattson
2019-09-17 14:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-09-17 15:11 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-09-16 16:22 ` [PATCH 2/3] KVM: x86: hyper-v: set NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing CPUID bit when SMT is impossible Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-09-16 16:34 ` Jim Mattson
2019-09-17 9:33 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-09-17 14:08 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2019-09-23 15:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-09-23 16:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-09-16 16:22 ` [PATCH 3/3] KVM: selftests: hyperv_cpuid: add check for NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing bit Vitaly Kuznetsov
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