From: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ykaukab@suse.de,
mlangsdo@redhat.com, steven.price@arm.com,
stefan.wahren@i2se.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 14:16:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fbcfae96-6cca-2a7a-a91b-8ffcc1a4c803@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7e843245-56c0-d7c1-38ba-27ff231a500a@arm.com>
On 10/01/2019 14:10, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Hi Julien,
>
> On 01/10/2019 03:23 AM, Julien Thierry wrote:
>> Hi Jeremy,
>>
>> On 09/01/2019 23:55, Jeremy Linton wrote:
>>> Display the mitigation status if active, otherwise
>>> assume the cpu is safe unless it doesn't have CSV3
>>> and isn't in our whitelist.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>> b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>> index ab784d7a0083..ef7bbc49ef78 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>> @@ -944,8 +944,12 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct
>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
>>> return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>>> }
>>> +/* default value is invalid until unmap_kernel_at_el0() runs */
>>> +static bool __meltdown_safe = true;
>>> +
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
>>> static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0:
>>> forced off */
>>> +extern uint arm64_requested_vuln_attrs;
>>> static bool is_cpu_meltdown_safe(void)
>>> {
>>> @@ -972,6 +976,14 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct
>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>> {
>>> char const *str = "command line option";
>>> + bool meltdown_safe = is_cpu_meltdown_safe() ||
>>> + has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>>> +
>>> + if (!meltdown_safe)
>>> + __meltdown_safe = false;
>>> +
>>> + arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |= VULN_MELTDOWN;
>>> +
>>> /*
>>> * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
>>> * ThunderX leads to apparent I-cache corruption of kernel
>>> text, which
>>> @@ -993,11 +1005,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct
>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
>>> return true;
>>> - if (is_cpu_meltdown_safe())
>>> - return false;
>>> -
>>> - /* Defer to CPU feature registers */
>>> - return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>>> + return !meltdown_safe;
>>> }
>>> static void
>>> @@ -2065,3 +2073,17 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void)
>>> }
>>> core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation);
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
>>> +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct
>>> device_attribute *attr,
>>> + char *buf)
>>> +{
>>> + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
>>> + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n");
>>> +
>>> + if (__meltdown_safe)
>>> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>>
>> An issue I see is that we don't even bother to check it that CPUs are
>> meltdown safe if CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is not defined but here
>> we'll advertise that the system is meltdown safe.
>
> That check isn't necessary anymore because the sysfs attribute is only
> populated if unmap_kernel_at_el0() runs (assuming I haven't messed
> something up). That was Dave/Will's suggestions in the last thread about
> how to handle this case.
>
Oh right, I missed that bit. Sorry for the noise.
>>
>> I think that checking whether we know that CPUs are meltdown safe should
>> be separated from whether mitigation is applied.
>>
>> Someone who knows thinks their CPUs are in the white list might want to
>> compile out code that does the kpti, but it would be good to give them a
>> proper diagnostic whether they were wrong or not.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>
--
Julien Thierry
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-10 14:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-09 23:55 [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] sysfs/cpu: Allow individual architectures to select vulnerabilities Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 10:02 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-01-18 15:46 ` Greg KH
2019-01-18 16:31 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: kpti: move check for non-vulnerable CPUs to a function Jeremy Linton
2019-01-12 10:41 ` Stefan Wahren
2019-01-14 11:32 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-01-18 16:35 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-01-10 9:23 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-10 14:10 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-10 14:16 ` Julien Thierry [this message]
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 10:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-01-14 16:37 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 17:05 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-01-15 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Stefan Wahren
2019-01-15 21:21 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-18 18:05 ` Stefan Wahren
2019-01-18 22:22 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-19 11:52 ` Stefan Wahren
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