From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8F94C169C4 for ; Sun, 3 Feb 2019 13:56:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 816AF218F0 for ; Sun, 3 Feb 2019 13:56:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729223AbfBCN4Z (ORCPT ); Sun, 3 Feb 2019 08:56:25 -0500 Received: from shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk ([88.96.1.126]:54010 "EHLO shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728432AbfBCNuE (ORCPT ); Sun, 3 Feb 2019 08:50:04 -0500 Received: from cable-78.29.236.164.coditel.net ([78.29.236.164] helo=deadeye) by shadbolt.decadent.org.uk with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1gqI9q-0003wE-Ic; Sun, 03 Feb 2019 13:50:02 +0000 Received: from ben by deadeye with local (Exim 4.92-RC4) (envelope-from ) id 1gqI9j-0007Eu-0u; Sun, 03 Feb 2019 14:49:55 +0100 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov , "Eric Biggers" , "Andy Lutomirski" , "Jiri Kosina" , "Jann Horn" , syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Date: Sun, 03 Feb 2019 14:45:08 +0100 Message-ID: X-Mailer: LinuxStableQueue (scripts by bwh) X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Subject: [PATCH 3.16 214/305] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges In-Reply-To: X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 78.29.236.164 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ben@decadent.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on shadbolt.decadent.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.63-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Biggers commit 8c01db7619f07c85c5cd81ec5eb83608b56c88f5 upstream. When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command. When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Alternatively, information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write to the file descriptor. Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases. No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely. Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found. Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events") Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina [bwh: Backported to 3.16; Directly include ] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -676,6 +678,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct fi switch (uhid->input_buf.type) { case UHID_CREATE: + /* + * 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is + * copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated + * privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write(). + */ + if (file->f_cred != current_cred() || uaccess_kernel()) { + pr_err_once("UHID_CREATE from different security context by process %d (%s), this is not allowed.\n", + task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm); + ret = -EACCES; + goto unlock; + } ret = uhid_dev_create(uhid, &uhid->input_buf); break; case UHID_CREATE2: