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From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@linux-powerpc.org>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Jon Masters" <jcm@redhat.com>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Frederic Weisbecker" <frederic@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 68/86] x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 16:55:33 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <lsq.1558022133.866567195@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1558022132.52852998@decadent.org.uk>

3.16.68-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 07f07f55a29cb705e221eda7894dd67ab81ef343 upstream.

Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations
because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to
store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems.

Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which
covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on
Intel CPUs.

The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling
after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to
the non idle sibling.

When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be
speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are
flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER.

When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this,
then there is no action required either because before returning to user
space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush
on the return to user path.

Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are
solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other
MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer
clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise.

This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle
driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for
two reasons:

 - The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver
   almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults
   to that new driver.

 - The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore
   unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates
   anymore, so there is no point in adding that.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop change in _mwaitx()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -149,3 +149,45 @@ Mitigation points
      This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
      kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
      so no extra mitigation required.
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+   cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+   repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+   a C-State.
+
+   When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+   sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+   The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+   and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+   protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+   the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+   idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+   activated.
+
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+   the system.
+
+   The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+   that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+   sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+   available to the non idle sibling.
+
+   When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+   sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+   speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+   flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+   in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+   The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+   not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+   has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+   preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+   functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+   legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+   not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
 /*
  * Interrupt control:
  */
@@ -46,11 +49,13 @@ static inline void native_irq_enable(voi
 
 static inline void native_safe_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
 static inline void native_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define MWAIT_SUBSTATE_MASK		0xf
 #define MWAIT_CSTATE_MASK		0xf
@@ -27,6 +28,8 @@ static inline void __monitor(const void
 
 static inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
@@ -34,6 +37,8 @@ static inline void __mwait(unsigned long
 
 static inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	trace_hardirqs_on();
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 
@@ -300,6 +301,17 @@ static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_bu
 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
+/**
+ * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always
 
 /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
 
 /* For use by asm MDS_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS */
 const u16 mds_clear_cpu_buffers_ds = __KERNEL_DS;


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-16 15:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 87+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-16 15:55 [PATCH 3.16 00/86] 3.16.68-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/86] MIPS: jump_label.c: Correct the span of the J instruction Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/86] x86/cpufeature: Add bug flags to /proc/cpuinfo Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/86] jump_label: Allow asm/jump_label.h to be included in assembly Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/86] s390/jump label: use different nop instruction Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/86] module, jump_label: Fix module locking Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/86] module: add within_module() function Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/86] jump_label: Fix small typos in the documentation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/86] jump_label: Allow jump labels to be used in assembly Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/86] MIPS: jump_label.c: Handle the microMIPS J instruction encoding Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/86] s390/jump label: add sanity checks Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 75/86] x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 43/86] x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 78/86] x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 32/86] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 63/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 34/86] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 64/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 79/86] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 66/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 76/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 21/86] x86/asm: Error out if asm/jump_label.h is included inappropriately Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/86] x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 45/86] x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 41/86] x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 14/86] locking/static_keys: Rework update logic Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 77/86] x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 27/86] x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 38/86] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 31/86] x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 33/86] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 70/86] x86/speculation/l1tf: Document l1tf in sysfs Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 16/86] jump label, locking/static_keys: Update docs Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 81/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 44/86] x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 60/86] kvm: x86: Report STIBP on GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 35/86] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 18/86] locking/static_keys: Fix a silly typo Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 80/86] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 40/86] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 30/86] x86/cpu: Sanitize FAM6_ATOM naming Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/86] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 39/86] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 50/86] x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 37/86] x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 82/86] x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 36/86] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/86] x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/86] x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 69/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 28/86] x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 71/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/86] x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 86/86] x86/bugs: Change L1TF mitigation string to match upstream Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/86] x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 48/86] x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 83/86] Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 23/86] x86/headers: Don't include asm/processor.h in asm/atomic.h Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 22/86] x86/asm: Add asm macros for static keys/jump labels Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 29/86] x86/speculation: Remove SPECTRE_V2_IBRS in enum spectre_v2_mitigation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 74/86] Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 24/86] x86/cpufeature: Carve out X86_FEATURE_* Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 62/86] x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelists Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 73/86] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 19/86] locking/static_keys: Fix up the static keys documentation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 15/86] locking/static_keys: Add a new static_key interface Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 49/86] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 46/86] x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/86] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/86] jump_label: Rename JUMP_LABEL_{EN,DIS}ABLE to JUMP_LABEL_{JMP,NOP} Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 85/86] x86/cpu/bugs: Use __initconst for 'const' init data Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 13/86] jump_label: Add jump_entry_key() helper Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 61/86] x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/86] x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 84/86] x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 67/86] x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 65/86] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/86] x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/86] jump_label, locking/static_keys: Rename JUMP_LABEL_TYPE_* and related helpers to the static_key* pattern Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 47/86] x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 26/86] locking/static_keys: Provide DECLARE and well as DEFINE macros Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 25/86] locking/static_key: Fix concurrent static_key_slow_inc() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 17/86] jump_label/x86: Work around asm build bug on older/backported GCCs Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 20/86] jump_label: make static_key_enabled() work on static_key_true/false types too Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 72/86] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV Ben Hutchings
2019-05-16 15:55 ` [PATCH 3.16 42/86] sched: Add sched_smt_active() Ben Hutchings

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