From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0023C433FF for ; Sat, 10 Aug 2019 20:54:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E15D2086A for ; Sat, 10 Aug 2019 20:54:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727816AbfHJUyF (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Aug 2019 16:54:05 -0400 Received: from shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk ([88.96.1.126]:53848 "EHLO shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726498AbfHJUnt (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Aug 2019 16:43:49 -0400 Received: from [192.168.4.242] (helo=deadeye) by shadbolt.decadent.org.uk with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1hwYDK-00053t-AE; Sat, 10 Aug 2019 21:43:46 +0100 Received: from ben by deadeye with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1hwYDJ-0003aP-HK; Sat, 10 Aug 2019 21:43:45 +0100 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , "Takashi Iwai" Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2019 21:40:07 +0100 Message-ID: X-Mailer: LinuxStableQueue (scripts by bwh) X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Subject: [PATCH 3.16 037/157] ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability In-Reply-To: X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 192.168.4.242 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ben@decadent.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on shadbolt.decadent.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.72-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" commit c709f14f0616482b67f9fbcb965e1493a03ff30b upstream. dev is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:626 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c @@ -617,13 +617,14 @@ int snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev, struct synth_info *inf) { struct seq_oss_synth *rec; + struct seq_oss_synthinfo *info = get_synthinfo_nospec(dp, dev); - if (dev < 0 || dev >= dp->max_synthdev) + if (!info) return -ENXIO; - if (dp->synths[dev].is_midi) { + if (info->is_midi) { struct midi_info minf; - snd_seq_oss_midi_make_info(dp, dp->synths[dev].midi_mapped, &minf); + snd_seq_oss_midi_make_info(dp, info->midi_mapped, &minf); inf->synth_type = SYNTH_TYPE_MIDI; inf->synth_subtype = 0; inf->nr_voices = 16;