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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com,
	penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
	borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
	dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
	mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 19:12:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <m18vl5900m.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABqD9haumYV6SizAXeR9Os69QgYEkW6fBC27dAYhOr-8U=p6_A@mail.gmail.com> (Will Drewry's message of "Sun, 15 Jan 2012 20:04:13 -0600")

Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> writes:

> One consideration could be to add do_exit()s at known DAC transitions
> (set*id, fcaps). I don't know if that'd be wise, but it would remove
> some described ambiguity.  The same could be done with exec when the
> (e)uid/gid/fcaps change.  However, none of that helps with the opaque
> LSM data, so that'd have to be left up to the LSMs and the LSM_* flag
> you've added.

I went through and audited userspace recently and I could not find
anything that did not handle setuid failing.  It looks like kernel
developers are not the only ones who learned from the
sendmail/capabilities problem.

Eric



  reply	other threads:[~2012-01-18  3:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-01-12 23:38 [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-13  0:51   ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-12 23:59     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13  1:35       ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-13 17:39   ` Eric Paris
2012-01-13 18:50     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-01-15  1:52   ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-16  1:41     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 23:29   ` Eric Paris
2012-01-17 23:54     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:47 ` [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13  0:03   ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13  0:42   ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13  0:57     ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13  1:11       ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13  1:17         ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-14 13:30           ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-14 19:21             ` Will Drewry
2012-01-14 20:22             ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-14 21:04               ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 20:16               ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 20:59                 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 21:32                   ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 22:07                     ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16  2:04                       ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18  3:12                         ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2012-01-16  2:41                       ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-16  7:45                         ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16 18:02                           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-13  1:37         ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13  1:41           ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13  2:09             ` Kees Cook

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