[PATCH v2] x86/bugs: protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB

[Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>]

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack 
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attack, 
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to 
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).

Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf

Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
---

v1 -> v2: 

	- Fixed typos/capatalization in SpectreRSB name
	- Josh's Reviewed-by

 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 38 +++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5c0ea39311fe..bc8c43b22460 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -313,23 +313,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	return cmd;
 }
 
-/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
-static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
-{
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
-		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
-			return true;
-		}
-	}
-	return false;
-}
-
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -390,22 +373,15 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
 	/*
-	 * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
-	 * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
-	 * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
-	 * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+	 * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
+	 * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
+	 * issues:
 	 *
-	 * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
-	 * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
-	 * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
-	 * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
-	 * switch is required.
+	 *	- RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
+	 *	- SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
 	 */
-	if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
-	     !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
-	}
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 
 	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs