From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
rjw@rjwysocki.net, Joey Lee <JLee@suse.com>,
linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 15:21:23 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1906241520500.27227@cbobk.fhfr.pm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190622175208.GB30317@amd>
On Sat, 22 Jun 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
> > from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
> > so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
> > kernel is locked down.
>
> I keep getting these...
>
> IIRC suse has patches to verify the images.
Yeah, Joey Lee is taking care of those. CCing.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-24 13:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-22 0:03 [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 2:01 ` Dave Young
2019-06-25 2:35 ` Dave Young
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 4:59 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 15:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 18:14 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 17:52 ` Pavel Machek
2019-06-24 13:21 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2019-07-10 15:26 ` Joey Lee
2019-07-11 4:11 ` joeyli
2019-06-22 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:01 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 1:49 ` Daniel Axtens
2019-06-27 15:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23 11:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23 1:57 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 15:15 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 19:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-24 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:59 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-25 15:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:25 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 23:01 ` [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM James Morris
2019-06-24 23:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 23:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-25 6:04 ` James Morris
2019-06-25 8:16 ` John Johansen
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