From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.9 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 987EFC67839 for ; Tue, 11 Dec 2018 10:52:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 692602081B for ; Tue, 11 Dec 2018 10:52:08 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 692602081B Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=zytor.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726623AbeLKKwH (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Dec 2018 05:52:07 -0500 Received: from terminus.zytor.com ([198.137.202.136]:42497 "EHLO terminus.zytor.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726114AbeLKKwF (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Dec 2018 05:52:05 -0500 Received: from terminus.zytor.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by terminus.zytor.com (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTPS id wBBAppR53954752 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 11 Dec 2018 02:51:51 -0800 Received: (from tipbot@localhost) by terminus.zytor.com (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id wBBApp2q3954749; Tue, 11 Dec 2018 02:51:51 -0800 Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 02:51:51 -0800 X-Authentication-Warning: terminus.zytor.com: tipbot set sender to tipbot@zytor.com using -f From: tip-bot for Michal Hocko Message-ID: Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-mm@kvack.org, ak@linux.intel.com, pasha.tatashin@soleen.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mhocko@suse.com, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, jkosina@suse.cz, bp@suse.de, mingo@kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org Reply-To: ak@linux.intel.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, tglx@linutronix.de, hpa@zytor.com, mhocko@suse.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pasha.tatashin@soleen.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, jkosina@suse.cz, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, mingo@kernel.org, bp@suse.de In-Reply-To: <20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org> References: <20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org> To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction when l1tf=off Git-Commit-ID: 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 X-Mailer: tip-git-log-daemon Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Commit-ID: 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 Author: Michal Hocko AuthorDate: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 19:49:10 +0100 Committer: Thomas Gleixner CommitDate: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 11:46:13 +0100 x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction when l1tf=off Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled. We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is clearly out of the limit. Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is forcefully disabled by the administrator. [ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ] Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2") Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen Acked-by: Jiri Kosina Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +++ Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 05a252e5178d..835e422572eb 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2095,6 +2095,9 @@ off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings. + It also drops the swap size and available + RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and + bare metal. Default is 'flush'. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst index b85dd80510b0..9af977384168 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst @@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are: off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings. + It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions + on both hypervisor and bare metal. + ============ ============================================================= The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`. @@ -576,7 +579,8 @@ Default mitigations The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are: - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done - unconditionally and cannot be controlled. + unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited + to ~16TB. - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for a guest. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index a68b32cb845a..58689ac64440 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1002,7 +1002,8 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void) #endif half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT; - if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { + if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF && + e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n"); pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n", half_pa); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index ef99f3892e1f..427a955a2cf2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void) pages = generic_max_swapfile_size(); - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) { + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF) { /* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */ unsigned long long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit(); /*