From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751577AbbDHHoG (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Apr 2015 03:44:06 -0400 Received: from terminus.zytor.com ([198.137.202.10]:34855 "EHLO terminus.zytor.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751177AbbDHHoD (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Apr 2015 03:44:03 -0400 Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2015 00:43:19 -0700 From: tip-bot for Denys Vlasenko Message-ID: Cc: keescook@chromium.org, fweisbec@gmail.com, ast@plumgrid.com, dvlasenk@redhat.com, wad@chromium.org, mingo@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, bp@alien8.de, oleg@redhat.com, bp@suse.de, hpa@zytor.com, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@amacapital.net, torvalds@linux-foundation.org Reply-To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, wad@chromium.org, mingo@kernel.org, dvlasenk@redhat.com, ast@plumgrid.com, fweisbec@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, luto@amacapital.net, hpa@zytor.com, tglx@linutronix.de, oleg@redhat.com, bp@suse.de, bp@alien8.de, rostedt@goodmis.org In-Reply-To: <1427993219-7291-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com> References: <1427993219-7291-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com> To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip:x86/asm] x86/asm/entry/64: Move opportunistic sysret code to syscall code path Git-Commit-ID: fffbb5dcfd29f8831e41b4dd2ab938bd36d35283 X-Mailer: tip-git-log-daemon Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Commit-ID: fffbb5dcfd29f8831e41b4dd2ab938bd36d35283 Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/fffbb5dcfd29f8831e41b4dd2ab938bd36d35283 Author: Denys Vlasenko AuthorDate: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 18:46:59 +0200 Committer: Ingo Molnar CommitDate: Wed, 8 Apr 2015 09:02:12 +0200 x86/asm/entry/64: Move opportunistic sysret code to syscall code path This change does two things: Copy-pastes "retint_swapgs:" code into syscall handling code, the copy is under "syscall_return:" label. The code is unchanged apart from some label renames. Removes "opportunistic sysret" code from "retint_swapgs:" code block, since now it won't be reached by syscall return. This in fact removes most of the code in question. text data bss dec hex filename 12530 0 0 12530 30f2 entry_64.o.before 12562 0 0 12562 3112 entry_64.o Run-tested. Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Will Drewry Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427993219-7291-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S index 65485b3..e4c8103 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S @@ -354,8 +354,8 @@ GLOBAL(int_with_check) movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx andl %edi,%edx jnz int_careful - andl $~TS_COMPAT,TI_status(%rcx) - jmp retint_swapgs + andl $~TS_COMPAT,TI_status(%rcx) + jmp syscall_return /* Either reschedule or signal or syscall exit tracking needed. */ /* First do a reschedule test. */ @@ -399,9 +399,86 @@ int_restore_rest: DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) TRACE_IRQS_OFF jmp int_with_check + +syscall_return: + /* The IRETQ could re-enable interrupts: */ + DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) + TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ + + /* + * Try to use SYSRET instead of IRET if we're returning to + * a completely clean 64-bit userspace context. + */ + movq RCX(%rsp),%rcx + cmpq %rcx,RIP(%rsp) /* RCX == RIP */ + jne opportunistic_sysret_failed + + /* + * On Intel CPUs, SYSRET with non-canonical RCX/RIP will #GP + * in kernel space. This essentially lets the user take over + * the kernel, since userspace controls RSP. It's not worth + * testing for canonicalness exactly -- this check detects any + * of the 17 high bits set, which is true for non-canonical + * or kernel addresses. (This will pessimize vsyscall=native. + * Big deal.) + * + * If virtual addresses ever become wider, this will need + * to be updated to remain correct on both old and new CPUs. + */ + .ifne __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT - 47 + .error "virtual address width changed -- SYSRET checks need update" + .endif + shr $__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT, %rcx + jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed + + cmpq $__USER_CS,CS(%rsp) /* CS must match SYSRET */ + jne opportunistic_sysret_failed + + movq R11(%rsp),%r11 + cmpq %r11,EFLAGS(%rsp) /* R11 == RFLAGS */ + jne opportunistic_sysret_failed + + /* + * SYSRET can't restore RF. SYSRET can restore TF, but unlike IRET, + * restoring TF results in a trap from userspace immediately after + * SYSRET. This would cause an infinite loop whenever #DB happens + * with register state that satisfies the opportunistic SYSRET + * conditions. For example, single-stepping this user code: + * + * movq $stuck_here,%rcx + * pushfq + * popq %r11 + * stuck_here: + * + * would never get past 'stuck_here'. + */ + testq $(X86_EFLAGS_RF|X86_EFLAGS_TF), %r11 + jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed + + /* nothing to check for RSP */ + + cmpq $__USER_DS,SS(%rsp) /* SS must match SYSRET */ + jne opportunistic_sysret_failed + + /* + * We win! This label is here just for ease of understanding + * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here. + */ +syscall_return_via_sysret: + CFI_REMEMBER_STATE + /* r11 is already restored (see code above) */ + RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_R11 + movq RSP(%rsp),%rsp + USERGS_SYSRET64 + CFI_RESTORE_STATE + +opportunistic_sysret_failed: + SWAPGS + jmp restore_c_regs_and_iret CFI_ENDPROC END(system_call) + .macro FORK_LIKE func ENTRY(stub_\func) CFI_STARTPROC @@ -673,76 +750,8 @@ retint_swapgs: /* return to user-space */ DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ - /* - * Try to use SYSRET instead of IRET if we're returning to - * a completely clean 64-bit userspace context. - */ - movq RCX(%rsp),%rcx - cmpq %rcx,RIP(%rsp) /* RCX == RIP */ - jne opportunistic_sysret_failed - - /* - * On Intel CPUs, sysret with non-canonical RCX/RIP will #GP - * in kernel space. This essentially lets the user take over - * the kernel, since userspace controls RSP. It's not worth - * testing for canonicalness exactly -- this check detects any - * of the 17 high bits set, which is true for non-canonical - * or kernel addresses. (This will pessimize vsyscall=native. - * Big deal.) - * - * If virtual addresses ever become wider, this will need - * to be updated to remain correct on both old and new CPUs. - */ - .ifne __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT - 47 - .error "virtual address width changed -- sysret checks need update" - .endif - shr $__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT, %rcx - jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed - - cmpq $__USER_CS,CS(%rsp) /* CS must match SYSRET */ - jne opportunistic_sysret_failed - - movq R11(%rsp),%r11 - cmpq %r11,EFLAGS(%rsp) /* R11 == RFLAGS */ - jne opportunistic_sysret_failed - - /* - * SYSRET can't restore RF. SYSRET can restore TF, but unlike IRET, - * restoring TF results in a trap from userspace immediately after - * SYSRET. This would cause an infinite loop whenever #DB happens - * with register state that satisfies the opportunistic SYSRET - * conditions. For example, single-stepping this user code: - * - * movq $stuck_here,%rcx - * pushfq - * popq %r11 - * stuck_here: - * - * would never get past 'stuck_here'. - */ - testq $(X86_EFLAGS_RF|X86_EFLAGS_TF), %r11 - jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed - - /* nothing to check for RSP */ - - cmpq $__USER_DS,SS(%rsp) /* SS must match SYSRET */ - jne opportunistic_sysret_failed - - /* - * We win! This label is here just for ease of understanding - * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here. - */ -irq_return_via_sysret: - CFI_REMEMBER_STATE - /* r11 is already restored (see code above) */ - RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_R11 - movq RSP(%rsp),%rsp - USERGS_SYSRET64 - CFI_RESTORE_STATE - -opportunistic_sysret_failed: SWAPGS - jmp restore_args + jmp restore_c_regs_and_iret /* Returning to kernel space */ retint_kernel: @@ -761,7 +770,12 @@ retint_kernel: * The iretq could re-enable interrupts: */ TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ -restore_args: + +/* + * At this label, code paths which return to kernel and to user, + * which come from interrupts/exception and from syscalls, merge. + */ +restore_c_regs_and_iret: RESTORE_C_REGS REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8