From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: git@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
git-packagers@googlegroups.com
Subject: [ANNOUNCE] Git v2.38.1 and others
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 10:01:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqq4jw1uku5.fsf@gitster.g> (raw)
A maintenance release v2.38.1, together with releases for older
maintenance tracks v2.30.6, v2.31.5, v2.32.4, v2.33.5, v2.34.5,
v2.35.5, v2.36.3, and v2.37.4, are now available at the usual
places.
These maintenance releases are to address the security issues
identified as CVE-2022-39253 and CVE-2022-39260.
The tarballs are found at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/
The following public repositories all have a copy of the v2.38.1
tag, as well as the tags for older maintenance tracks for v2.30.6,
v2.31.5, v2.32.4, v2.33.5, v2.34.5, v2.35.5, v2.36.3, and v2.37.4.
url = https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/git/git
url = https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/git/git
url = git://repo.or.cz/alt-git.git
url = https://github.com/gitster/git
CVE-2022-39253:
When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
(or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
repository.
Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
"user" by default.
CVE-2022-39260:
An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
`$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
`git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
inputs larger than 2GiB.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
reply other threads:[~2022-10-18 17:07 UTC|newest]
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