From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andrew Morton Subject: [patch 041/127] mm: add kvfree_sensitive() for freeing sensitive data objects Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2020 16:48:21 -0700 Message-ID: <20200604234821.eW1nawh1U%akpm@linux-foundation.org> References: <20200604164523.e15f3177f4b69dcb4f2534a1@linux-foundation.org> Reply-To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:44650 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725930AbgFDXsX (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Jun 2020 19:48:23 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20200604164523.e15f3177f4b69dcb4f2534a1@linux-foundation.org> Sender: mm-commits-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dhowells@redhat.com, ebiggers@google.com, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, joe@perches.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, longman@redhat.com, mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, rientjes@google.com, serge@hallyn.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, urezki@gmail.com, willy@infradead.org From: Waiman Long Subject: mm: add kvfree_sensitive() for freeing sensitive data objects For kvmalloc'ed data object that contains sensitive information like cryptographic keys, we need to make sure that the buffer is always cleared before freeing it. Using memset() alone for buffer clearing may not provide certainty as the compiler may compile it away. To be sure, the special memzero_explicit() has to be used. This patch introduces a new kvfree_sensitive() for freeing those sensitive data objects allocated by kvmalloc(). The relevant places where kvfree_sensitive() can be used are modified to use it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407200318.11711-1-longman@redhat.com Fixes: 4f0882491a14 ("KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read") Signed-off-by: Waiman Long Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: David Howells Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Joe Perches Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Uladzislau Rezki Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + mm/util.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/internal.h | 11 ----------- security/keys/keyctl.c | 16 +++++----------- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/mm.h~mm-add-kvfree_sensitive-for-freeing-sensitive-data-objects +++ a/include/linux/mm.h @@ -776,6 +776,7 @@ static inline void *kvcalloc(size_t n, s } extern void kvfree(const void *addr); +extern void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len); /* * Mapcount of compound page as a whole, does not include mapped sub-pages. --- a/mm/util.c~mm-add-kvfree_sensitive-for-freeing-sensitive-data-objects +++ a/mm/util.c @@ -604,6 +604,24 @@ void kvfree(const void *addr) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvfree); +/** + * kvfree_sensitive - Free a data object containing sensitive information. + * @addr: address of the data object to be freed. + * @len: length of the data object. + * + * Use the special memzero_explicit() function to clear the content of a + * kvmalloc'ed object containing sensitive data to make sure that the + * compiler won't optimize out the data clearing. + */ +void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len) +{ + if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(addr))) { + memzero_explicit((void *)addr, len); + kvfree(addr); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvfree_sensitive); + static inline void *__page_rmapping(struct page *page) { unsigned long mapping; --- a/security/keys/internal.h~mm-add-kvfree_sensitive-for-freeing-sensitive-data-objects +++ a/security/keys/internal.h @@ -350,15 +350,4 @@ static inline void key_check(const struc #define key_check(key) do {} while(0) #endif - -/* - * Helper function to clear and free a kvmalloc'ed memory object. - */ -static inline void __kvzfree(const void *addr, size_t len) -{ - if (addr) { - memset((void *)addr, 0, len); - kvfree(addr); - } -} #endif /* _INTERNAL_H */ --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c~mm-add-kvfree_sensitive-for-freeing-sensitive-data-objects +++ a/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -142,10 +142,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __us key_ref_put(keyring_ref); error3: - if (payload) { - memzero_explicit(payload, plen); - kvfree(payload); - } + kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen); error2: kfree(description); error: @@ -360,7 +357,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, key_ref_put(key_ref); error2: - __kvzfree(payload, plen); + kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen); error: return ret; } @@ -914,7 +911,7 @@ can_read_key: */ if (ret > key_data_len) { if (unlikely(key_data)) - __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len); + kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len); key_data_len = ret; continue; /* Allocate buffer */ } @@ -923,7 +920,7 @@ can_read_key: ret = -EFAULT; break; } - __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len); + kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len); key_put_out: key_put(key); @@ -1225,10 +1222,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_s keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL); error2: - if (payload) { - memzero_explicit(payload, plen); - kvfree(payload); - } + kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen); error: return ret; } _