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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, andreyknvl@google.com,
	aryabinin@virtuozzo.com, Branislav.Rankov@arm.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, dvyukov@google.com, elver@google.com,
	eugenis@google.com, glider@google.com, gor@linux.ibm.com,
	kevin.brodsky@arm.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	vincenzo.frascino@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com
Subject: [patch 18/78] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_range
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 14:02:23 -0800
Message-ID: <20201218220223.QbwkH2neg%akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201218140046.497484741326828e5b5d46ec@linux-foundation.org>

From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_range

This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.

The new mode won't be using shadow memory.  Rename external annotation
kasan_unpoison_shadow() to kasan_unpoison_range(), and introduce internal
functions (un)poison_range() (without kasan_ prefix).

Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fccdcaa13dc6b2211bf363d6c6d499279a54fe3a.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 include/linux/kasan.h |    6 ++--
 kernel/fork.c         |    4 +--
 mm/kasan/common.c     |   49 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 mm/kasan/generic.c    |   23 ++++++++----------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      |    3 +-
 mm/kasan/tags.c       |    2 -
 mm/slab_common.c      |    2 -
 7 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-rename-unpoison_shadow-to-unpoison_range
+++ a/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ extern void kasan_enable_current(void);
 /* Disable reporting bugs for current task */
 extern void kasan_disable_current(void);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size);
+void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size);
 
 void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ struct kasan_cache {
 size_t __ksize(const void *);
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
 {
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
+	kasan_unpoison_range(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
 }
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
 
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabl
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
 
--- a/kernel/fork.c~kasan-rename-unpoison_shadow-to-unpoison_range
+++ a/kernel/fork.c
@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack
 		if (!s)
 			continue;
 
-		/* Clear the KASAN shadow of the stack. */
-		kasan_unpoison_shadow(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+		/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
+		kasan_unpoison_range(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
 
 		/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
 		memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-rename-unpoison_shadow-to-unpoison_range
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src
  * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
  * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
  */
-void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+void poison_range(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
 	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *add
 	__memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
+void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
 	u8 tag = get_tag(address);
 
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *a
 	 */
 	address = reset_tag(address);
 
-	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
+	poison_range(address, size, tag);
 
 	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
@@ -148,12 +148,17 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *a
 	}
 }
 
+void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+	unpoison_range(address, size);
+}
+
 static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 {
 	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
 	size_t size = sp - base;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, size);
+	unpoison_range(base, size);
 }
 
 /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stac
 	 */
 	void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
+	unpoison_range(base, watermark - base);
 }
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
@@ -186,13 +191,13 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page
 	tag = random_tag();
 	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
 		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	unpoison_range(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
 	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
+		poison_range(page_address(page),
 				PAGE_SIZE << order,
 				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
 }
@@ -284,18 +289,18 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page
 
 	for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
 		page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page), page_size(page),
-			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+	poison_range(page_address(page), page_size(page),
+		     KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
 void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, cache->object_size);
+	unpoison_range(object, cache->object_size);
 }
 
 void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object,
+	poison_range(object,
 			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
 			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
@@ -408,7 +413,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kme
 	}
 
 	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
+	poison_range(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
 	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
 			unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
@@ -448,9 +453,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem
 		tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
 	/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
-		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+	unpoison_range(set_tag(object, tag), size);
+	poison_range((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+		     KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
 		kasan_set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
@@ -489,9 +494,9 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(
 				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
-		KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
+	unpoison_range(ptr, size);
+	poison_range((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+		     KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
 
 	return (void *)ptr;
 }
@@ -523,7 +528,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsig
 			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 			return;
 		}
-		kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+		poison_range(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
 	} else {
 		__kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
 	}
@@ -709,7 +714,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long
 	 * // vmalloc() allocates memory
 	 * // let a = area->addr
 	 * // we reach kasan_populate_vmalloc
-	 * // and call kasan_unpoison_shadow:
+	 * // and call unpoison_range:
 	 * STORE shadow(a), unpoison_val
 	 * ...
 	 * STORE shadow(a+99), unpoison_val	x = LOAD p
@@ -744,7 +749,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *st
 		return;
 
 	size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
+	poison_range(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
 }
 
 void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
@@ -752,7 +757,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *
 	if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
 		return;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(start, size);
+	unpoison_range(start, size);
 }
 
 static int kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c~kasan-rename-unpoison_shadow-to-unpoison_range
+++ a/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -202,11 +202,11 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan
 {
 	size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(global->beg, global->size);
+	unpoison_range(global->beg, global->size);
 
-	kasan_poison_shadow(global->beg + aligned_size,
-		global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size,
-		KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE);
+	poison_range(global->beg + aligned_size,
+		     global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size,
+		     KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE);
 }
 
 void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size)
@@ -285,13 +285,12 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long
 
 	WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE));
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
-			      size - rounded_down_size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
-			KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(right_redzone,
-			padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
-			KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT);
+	unpoison_range((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
+		       size - rounded_down_size);
+	poison_range(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
+		     KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT);
+	poison_range(right_redzone, padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
+		     KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_alloca_poison);
 
@@ -301,7 +300,7 @@ void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void
 	if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom))
 		return;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
+	unpoison_range(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison);
 
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h~kasan-rename-unpoison_shadow-to-unpoison_range
+++ a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const
 	return (addr >= kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void poison_range(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size);
 
 /**
  * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
--- a/mm/kasan/tags.c~kasan-rename-unpoison_shadow-to-unpoison_range
+++ a/mm/kasan/tags.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag);
+	poison_range((void *)addr, size, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
 
--- a/mm/slab_common.c~kasan-rename-unpoison_shadow-to-unpoison_range
+++ a/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
 	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
 	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(objp, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size);
 	return size;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
_

  parent reply index

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-18 22:00 incoming Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 01/78] mm/memcg: bail early from swap accounting if memcg disabled Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 02/78] mm/memcg: warning on !memcg after readahead page charged Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 03/78] mm/memcg: remove unused definitions Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 04/78] mm, kvm: account kvm_vcpu_mmap to kmemcg Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 05/78] mm/memcontrol:rewrite mem_cgroup_page_lruvec() Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 06/78] epoll: check for events when removing a timed out thread from the wait queue Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 07/78] epoll: simplify signal handling Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 08/78] epoll: pull fatal signal checks into ep_send_events() Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 09/78] epoll: move eavail next to the list_empty_careful check Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:01 ` [patch 10/78] epoll: simplify and optimize busy loop logic Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 11/78] epoll: pull all code between fetch_events and send_event into the loop Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 12/78] epoll: replace gotos with a proper loop Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 13/78] epoll: eliminate unnecessary lock for zero timeout Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 14/78] kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 15/78] kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 16/78] kasan: group vmalloc code Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 17/78] kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 19/78] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_* Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 20/78] kasan: only build init.c for software modes Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 21/78] kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c Andrew Morton
2020-12-19  0:28   ` Marco Elver
2020-12-19  1:13     ` Andrew Morton
2020-12-19 10:01       ` Marco Elver
2020-12-19 10:11       ` Marco Elver
2020-12-19 18:01       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-12-19 19:17       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-12-19 19:26         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-12-21  9:46         ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-12-21 17:41           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-12-22 18:38             ` Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 22/78] kasan: define KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 23/78] kasan: rename report and tags files Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 24/78] kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 25/78] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 26/78] kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 27/78] kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:02 ` [patch 28/78] kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth " Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 29/78] kasan, arm64: move initialization message Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 30/78] kasan, arm64: rename kasan_init_tags and mark as __init Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 31/78] kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 32/78] kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 33/78] kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 34/78] kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 35/78] kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 36/78] arm64: enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 37/78] arm64: mte: add in-kernel MTE helpers Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 38/78] arm64: mte: reset the page tag in page->flags Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 39/78] arm64: mte: add in-kernel tag fault handler Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 40/78] arm64: kasan: allow enabling in-kernel MTE Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 41/78] arm64: mte: convert gcr_user into an exclude mask Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 42/78] arm64: mte: switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 43/78] kasan, mm: untag page address in free_reserved_area Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 44/78] arm64: kasan: align allocations for HW_TAGS Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 45/78] arm64: kasan: add arch layer for memory tagging helpers Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 46/78] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE for HW_TAGS Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:03 ` [patch 47/78] kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 48/78] kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 49/78] kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 50/78] kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 51/78] kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 52/78] kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 53/78] kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 54/78] kselftest/arm64: check GCR_EL1 after context switch Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 55/78] kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 56/78] kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 57/78] kasan: introduce set_alloc_info Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 58/78] kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 59/78] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 60/78] kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 61/78] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 62/78] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 63/78] kasan: open-code kasan_unpoison_slab Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:04 ` [patch 64/78] kasan: inline (un)poison_range and check_invalid_free Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 65/78] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 66/78] kasan, mm: check kasan_enabled in annotations Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 67/78] kasan, mm: rename kasan_poison_kfree Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 68/78] kasan: don't round_up too much Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 69/78] kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 70/78] kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 71/78] kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 72/78] kasan, mm: allow cache merging with no metadata Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 73/78] kasan: update documentation Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 74/78] mm/Kconfig: fix spelling mistake "whats" -> "what's" Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 75/78] epoll: convert internal api to timespec64 Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 76/78] epoll: add syscall epoll_pwait2 Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 77/78] epoll: wire up " Andrew Morton
2020-12-18 22:05 ` [patch 78/78] selftests/filesystems: expand epoll with epoll_pwait2 Andrew Morton

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mm-commits Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/mm-commits/0 mm-commits/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 mm-commits mm-commits/ https://lore.kernel.org/mm-commits \
		mm-commits@vger.kernel.org
	public-inbox-index mm-commits

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:
	nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/org.kernel.vger.mm-commits


AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git