From: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings-s/n/eUQHGBpZroRs9YW3xA@public.gmane.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Linux Containers
<containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>,
David Miller <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 09/17] net: Allow userns root control of the core of the network stack.
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2012 18:29:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1353522582.2619.31.camel@bwh-desktop.uk.solarflarecom.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87lie13q18.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
On Fri, 2012-11-16 at 18:46 -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Ben Hutchings <bhutchings-s/n/eUQHGBpZroRs9YW3xA@public.gmane.org> writes:
>
> > On Fri, 2012-11-16 at 06:32 -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> Glauber Costa <glommer-bzQdu9zFT3WakBO8gow8eQ@public.gmane.org> writes:
> >>
> >> > On 11/16/2012 05:03 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> >> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> >> >> + return -EPERM;
> >> >> +
> >> >> return netdev_store(dev, attr, buf, len, change_tx_queue_len);
> >> >
> >> > You mean ns_capable here?
> >>
> >> No. There I meant capable.
> >>
> >> I deliberately call capable here because I don't understand what
> >> the tx_queue_len well enough to be certain it is safe to relax
> >> that check to be just ns_capable.
> >>
> >> My get feel is that allowing an unprivileged user to be able to
> >> arbitrarily change the tx_queue_len on a networking device would be a
> >> nice way to allow queuing as many network packets as you would like with
> >> kernel memory and DOSing the machine.
> >>
> >> So since with a quick read of the code I could not convince myself it
> >> was safe to allow unprivilged users to change tx_queue_len I left it
> >> protected by capable. While at the same time I relaxed the check in
> >> netdev_store to be ns_capable.
> >
> > Tor the same reason you had better be very selective about which ethtool
> > commands are allowed based on per-user_ns CAP_NET_ADMIN. Consider for a
> > start:
> >
> > ETHTOOL_SEEPROM => brick the NIC
> > ETHTOOL_FLASHDEV => brick the NIC; own the system if it's not using an IOMMU
>
> These are prevented by not having access to real hardware by default. A
> physical network interface must be moved into a network namespace for
> you to have access to it.
Yes, I realise that. The question is whether you would expect anything
in a container to be able to do those things, even with a physical net
device assigned to it.
Actually we have the same issue without considering containers - should
CAP_NET_ADMIN really give you low-level control over hardware just
because it's networking hardware? I think some of these ethtool
operations, and access to non-standard MDIO registers, should perhaps
require an additional capability (CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_RAWIO?).
> There are a handful of software network devices that are generally safe
> macvlan, veth, tun, ipip tunnels, etc. Using those network devices is
> very interesting and about as performant as you can get while still
> being safe.
>
> A buffer overflow in an ethtool command looks as likely to me as being
> able to own the system by reflashing the NIC.
Sure, if you can find one. But on many NICs the firmware can perform
more or less arbitrary DMA *by design* (one reason for using IOMMUs),
and the ability to update the firmware is not a bug to be fixed!
> Access to a real physical NIC is an act of trust. Given the general
> linux policy that drivers are merged when they mostly work I don't
> currently know of any trust models between "I trust you with full access
> to this device" and "I don't trust you with direct access to this
> device" that I would feel confident giving to an untrusted user.
At the moment it's 'I trust you with full access to *all* network
devices' (init ns CAP_NET_ADMIN), 'I trust you with some reconfiguration
of these network devices' (other ns CAP_NET_ADMIN) and 'I don't trust
you...'
You're expanding what other-ns-CAP_NET_ADMIN means, to 'I trust you with
full access to these network devices'.
> Which is a convoluted way of saying "ip link set eth0 netns bob" is the
> moral equivalent of "chown bob.bob /dev/eth0; chmod u+rwx /dev/eth0"
[...]
And it's previously been decided that ownership of a block device still
should *not* mean full control over it (see responses to CVE-2011-4127).
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings, Staff Engineer, Solarflare
Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job.
They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-11-21 18:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-11-16 13:01 [PATCH net-next 0/17] Make the network stack usable by userns root Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87d2zd8zwn.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-16 13:02 ` [PATCH net-next 01/17] netns: Deduplicate and fix copy_net_ns when !CONFIG_NET_NS Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:02 ` [PATCH net-next 02/17] userns: make each net (net_ns) belong to a user_ns Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <1353070992-5552-1-git-send-email-ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-16 13:02 ` [PATCH net-next 03/17] sysctl: Pass useful parameters to sysctl permissions Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:02 ` [PATCH net-next 04/17] net: Don't export sysctls to unprivileged users Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 05/17] net: Push capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) into the rtnl methods Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 06/17] net: Update the per network namespace sysctls to be available to the network namespace owner Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 07/17] user_ns: get rid of duplicate code in net_ctl_permissions Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 08/17] net: Allow userns root to force the scm creds Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 10/17] net: Allow userns root to control ipv4 Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 11/17] net: Allow userns root to control ipv6 Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 12/17] net: Allow userns root to control llc, netfilter, netlink, packet, and xfrm Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 14/17] net: Allow the userns root to control vlans Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 15/17] net: Enable some sysctls that are safe for the userns root Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 16/17] net: Enable a userns root rtnl calls that are safe for unprivilged users Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 17/17] net: Make CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE per user namespace Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 09/17] net: Allow userns root control of the core of the network stack Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <1353070992-5552-9-git-send-email-ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-16 13:55 ` Glauber Costa
2012-11-16 14:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <871uft8vpm.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-17 0:28 ` Ben Hutchings
[not found] ` <1353112116.2743.79.camel-/LGg1Z1CJKReKY3V0RtoKmatzQS1i7+A3tAM5lWOD0I@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-17 2:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87lie13q18.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-21 18:29 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2012-11-16 13:03 ` [PATCH net-next 13/17] net: Allow userns root to control the network bridge code Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-19 3:26 ` [PATCH net-next 0/17] Make the network stack usable by userns root David Miller
[not found] ` <20121118.222601.1683927229305655885.davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-19 7:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87haomkq7q.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-19 18:52 ` David Miller
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