netdev.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: recvmsg: Unconditionally zero struct sockaddr_storage
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 10:31:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1509471094.3828.26.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171031161445.GA140874@beast>

On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:14 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Some protocols do not correctly wipe the contents of the on-stack
> struct sockaddr_storage sent down into recvmsg() (e.g. SCTP), and leak
> kernel stack contents to userspace. This wipes it unconditionally before
> per-protocol handlers run.
> 
> Note that leaks like this are mitigated by building with
> CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y
> 
> Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  net/socket.c | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
> index c729625eb5d3..34183f4fbdf8 100644
> --- a/net/socket.c
> +++ b/net/socket.c
> @@ -2188,6 +2188,7 @@ static int ___sys_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
>  	struct sockaddr __user *uaddr;
>  	int __user *uaddr_len = COMPAT_NAMELEN(msg);
>  
> +	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
>  	msg_sys->msg_name = &addr;
>  

This kind of patch comes every year.

Standard answer is : We fix the buggy protocol, we do not make
everything slower just because we are lazy.

struct sockaddr is 128 bytes, but IPV4 only uses a fraction of it.

Also memset() is using long word stores, so next 4-byte or 2-byte stores
on same location hit a performance problem on x86.

By adding all these defensive programming, we would give strong
incentives to bypass the kernel for networking. That would be bad.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-10-31 17:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-31 16:14 [PATCH] net: recvmsg: Unconditionally zero struct sockaddr_storage Kees Cook
2017-10-31 17:31 ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2017-11-01 12:48   ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-01 18:23     ` Kees Cook
2017-11-15  8:22       ` Alexander Potapenko
2017-11-16  4:17         ` [PATCH net] net/sctp: Always set scope_id in sctp_inet6_skb_msgname Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-16 14:00           ` David Miller
2017-11-15  2:13     ` [PATCH] net: recvmsg: Unconditionally zero struct sockaddr_storage Kees Cook
2017-11-15 18:37       ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-31 17:35 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-11-01  6:49 ` Willy Tarreau

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1509471094.3828.26.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com \
    --to=eric.dumazet@gmail.com \
    --cc=andreyknvl@google.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=kcc@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=security@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).