Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions

From: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>,
	Haim Dreyfuss <haim.dreyfuss@intel.com>,
	Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>,
	Petr Stourac <pstourac@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@intel.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Nathan Errera <nathan.errera@intel.com>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Shaul Triebitz <shaul.triebitz@intel.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com>,
	Abhishek Naik <abhishek.naik@intel.com>,
	Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>,
	Ayala Beker <ayala.beker@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org,
	Sriram R <quic_srirrama@quicinc.com>,
	Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>,
	Mike Golant <michael.golant@intel.com>,
	Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
	linux-next@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 17:46:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1d3a2fafcc14de7406fd689029277fd74ed3ce87.camel@sipsolutions.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202211181424.794FCAD@keescook>

On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 14:25 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 10:04:38PM +0100, Johannes Berg wrote:
> > On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 08:54 -0800, coverity-bot wrote:
> > > 
> > > *** CID 1527370:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
> > > drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mld-key.c:123 in iwl_mvm_sec_key_add()
> > > 117
> > > 118     	if (WARN_ON(keyconf->keylen > sizeof(cmd.u.add.key)))
> > > 119     		return -EINVAL;
> > > 120
> > > 121     	if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
> > > 122     	    keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
> > > vvv     CID 1527370:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
> > > vvv     Overrunning buffer pointed to by "cmd.u.add.key + 3" of 32 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 34 using argument "keyconf->keylen" (which evaluates to 32). [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
> > > 123     		memcpy(cmd.u.add.key + IWL_SEC_WEP_KEY_OFFSET, keyconf->key,
> > > 124     		       keyconf->keylen);
> > > 125     	else
> > > 126     		memcpy(cmd.u.add.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen);
> > > 127
> > > 128     	if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) {
> > > 
> > > If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
> > > such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
> > > sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
> > > include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
> > > 
> > 
> > Well, I don't think you can teach coverity this easily, but the
> > WARN_ON() check there is not really meant to protect this - WEP keys
> > must have a length of either 5 or 13 bytes (40 or 104 bits!).
> > 
> > So there's no issue here, but I'm not surprised that coverity wouldn't
> > be able to figure that out through the stack.
> 
> Gotcha. And some other layer is doing the verification that cipher and
> keylen are correctly matched?

Yes, the key must come through cfg80211_validate_key_settings() at some
point.

johannes