From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Subject: Re: [PULL] vhost: cleanups and fixes Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 19:38:12 -0400 Message-ID: <20181101193516-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20181101171938-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: lenaic@lhuard.fr, Michal Hocko , bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com, KVM , Network Development , liang.z.li@intel.com, LKML , virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, Stefan Hajnoczi , Joe Perches , Andrew Morton , Michal Hocko , Linus Torvalds To: Kees Cook Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: virtualization-bounces@lists.linux-foundation.org Errors-To: virtualization-bounces@lists.linux-foundation.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 04:00:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Thu, Nov 1, 2018 at 2:19 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > The following changes since commit 84df9525b0c27f3ebc2ebb1864fa62a97fde= db7d: > > > > Linux 4.19 (2018-10-22 07:37:37 +0100) > > > > are available in the Git repository at: > > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost.git tags/for_= linus > > > > for you to fetch changes up to 79f800b2e76923cd8ce0aa659cb5c019d9643bc9: > > > > MAINTAINERS: remove reference to bogus vsock file (2018-10-24 21:16:1= 4 -0400) > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > virtio, vhost: fixes, tweaks > > > > virtio balloon page hinting support > > vhost scsi control queue > > > > misc fixes. > > > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > Bijan Mottahedeh (3): > > vhost/scsi: Respond to control queue operations > = > +static void > +vhost_scsi_send_tmf_resp(struct vhost_scsi *vs, > + struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, > + int head, unsigned int out) > +{ > + struct virtio_scsi_ctrl_tmf_resp __user *resp; > + struct virtio_scsi_ctrl_tmf_resp rsp; > + int ret; > + > + pr_debug("%s\n", __func__); > + memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp)); > + rsp.response =3D VIRTIO_SCSI_S_FUNCTION_REJECTED; > + resp =3D vq->iov[out].iov_base; > + ret =3D __copy_to_user(resp, &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); > = > Is it actually safe to trust that iov_base has passed an earlier > access_ok() check here? Why not just use copy_to_user() instead? > = > -Kees I am not sure copy_to_user will do the right thing here, because all this runs in context of a kernel thread. We do need access_ok which takes place way earlier in context of the task. Another reason it is safe is because the address is not coming from userspace at all. > > vhost/scsi: Extract common handling code from control queue handl= er > > vhost/scsi: Use common handling code in request queue handler > > > > Greg Edwards (1): > > vhost/scsi: truncate T10 PI iov_iter to prot_bytes > > > > L=E9na=EFc Huard (1): > > kvm_config: add CONFIG_VIRTIO_MENU > > > > Stefan Hajnoczi (1): > > MAINTAINERS: remove reference to bogus vsock file > > > > Wei Wang (3): > > virtio-balloon: VIRTIO_BALLOON_F_FREE_PAGE_HINT > > mm/page_poison: expose page_poisoning_enabled to kernel modules > > virtio-balloon: VIRTIO_BALLOON_F_PAGE_POISON > > > > MAINTAINERS | 1 - > > drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 426 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= -------- > > drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c | 380 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= +--- > > include/uapi/linux/virtio_balloon.h | 8 + > > kernel/configs/kvm_guest.config | 1 + > > mm/page_poison.c | 6 + > > 6 files changed, 688 insertions(+), 134 deletions(-) > = > = > = > -- = > Kees Cook