netdev.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] vhost: block speculation of translated descriptors
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2019 14:33:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190911123316.GX4023@dhcp22.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190911082236-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>

On Wed 11-09-19 08:25:03, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 02:16:28PM +0200, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > On Wed 11-09-19 08:10:00, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > iovec addresses coming from vhost are assumed to be
> > > pre-validated, but in fact can be speculated to a value
> > > out of range.
> > > 
> > > Userspace address are later validated with array_index_nospec so we can
> > > be sure kernel info does not leak through these addresses, but vhost
> > > must also not leak userspace info outside the allowed memory table to
> > > guests.
> > > 
> > > Following the defence in depth principle, make sure
> > > the address is not validated out of node range.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> > > Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
> > > Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
> > 
> > no need to mark fo stable? Other spectre fixes tend to be backported
> > even when the security implications are not really clear. The risk
> > should be low and better to be covered in case.
> 
> This is not really a fix - more a defence in depth thing,
> quite similar to e.g.  commit b3bbfb3fb5d25776b8e3f361d2eedaabb0b496cd
> x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
> in scope.
>
> That one doesn't seem to be tagged for stable. Was it queued
> there in practice?

not marked for stable but it went in. At least to 4.4.

-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-11 12:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-11 12:10 [PATCH v2] vhost: block speculation of translated descriptors Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-09-11 12:16 ` Michal Hocko
2019-09-11 12:25   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-09-11 12:33     ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2019-09-11 13:03       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-09-11 13:12         ` Michal Hocko
2019-09-11 13:51           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-09-11 13:52 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-09-11 16:25   ` Will Deacon

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190911123316.GX4023@dhcp22.suse.cz \
    --to=mhocko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jasowang@redhat.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mst@redhat.com \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).