From: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
<netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org>, <yusongping@huawei.com>,
<anton.sirazetdinov@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 13/15] seltests/landlock: ruleset expanding test
Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 23:20:36 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220516152038.39594-14-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220516152038.39594-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
This patch adds expanding rulesets in which
rules are gradually added one by one, restricting
sockets' connections.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v3:
* Add ruleset_expanding test.
Changes since v4:
* Refactoring code with self->port, self->addr4 variables.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 152 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index 1d8c9dfdbd48..b1639a55a898 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -728,4 +728,156 @@ TEST_F_FORK(socket_test, ruleset_overlap) {
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
}
+TEST_F_FORK(socket_test, ruleset_expanding) {
+
+ int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_1,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1 */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket(_metadata, false, true);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[0], sizeof(self->addr4[0])));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[0],
+ sizeof(self->addr4[0])));
+
+ /* Closes socket 1 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2 */
+ sockfd_2 = create_socket(_metadata, false, true);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * cause there is no rule with bind() access for port[1].
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind(sockfd_2, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[1], sizeof(self->addr4[1])));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Adds connect() access to port[0] */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ /* Adds bind() access to port[1] */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_2,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+ /* Adds rule to port[1] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_2));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1 */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket(_metadata, false, true);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[0], sizeof(self->addr4[0])));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[0],
+ sizeof(self->addr4[0])));
+ /* Closes socket 1 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2 */
+ sockfd_2 = create_socket(_metadata, false, true);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * cause just one layer has bind() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind(sockfd_2, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[1], sizeof(self->addr4[1])));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_3 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Restricts connect() access to port[0] */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_3 = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_3,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_3), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_3);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_3, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_4, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_3);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_3));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1 */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket(_metadata, false, true);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[0], sizeof(self->addr4[0])));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 1 to address with port[0],
+ * cause just one layer has connect() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&self->addr4[0],
+ sizeof(self->addr4[0])));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Closes socket 1 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+}
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-16 15:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-16 15:20 [PATCH v5 00/15] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 01/15] landlock: access mask renaming Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17 8:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-18 9:16 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 02/15] landlock: landlock_find/insert_rule refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 03/15] landlock: merge and inherit function refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17 8:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-18 9:18 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 04/15] landlock: helper functions refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 17:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-16 17:43 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 18:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-18 9:14 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 05/15] landlock: landlock_add_rule syscall refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17 8:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-17 8:10 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 9:24 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 9:23 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 14:37 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24 8:35 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 06/15] landlock: user space API network support Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 07/15] landlock: add support network rules Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17 8:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 9:27 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 14:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24 8:36 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 08/15] landlock: TCP network hooks implementation Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17 8:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 11:40 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 09/15] seltests/landlock: add tests for bind() hooks Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 21:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 12:10 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 14:29 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24 8:34 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 10/15] seltests/landlock: add tests for connect() hooks Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 11/15] seltests/landlock: connect() with AF_UNSPEC tests Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17 8:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 12:31 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 15:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24 8:40 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 15:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24 8:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 12/15] seltests/landlock: rules overlapping test Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 17:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 12:24 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 15:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24 8:55 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` Konstantin Meskhidze [this message]
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 14/15] seltests/landlock: invalid user input data test Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 15/15] samples/landlock: adds network demo Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17 9:19 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 13:33 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 15:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24 8:41 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-20 10:48 ` [PATCH v5 00/15] Network support for Landlock - UDP discussion Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-25 9:41 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
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